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PLEBISCITES, PARTICIPATION, AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 
Clayton P. Gillette* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Participation is again in the air. Apparently fueled by current de-
bates concerning decentralized power1 and republican versus pluralist 
traditions in our political and legal theory,2 those concerned with 
political decisionmaking have turned their attention to calls for in-
creased public involvement in the process. As has been true in the 
past, 3 the objectives of those who advocate increased participation are 
by no means uniform. Some stress the positive effects that broad par-
ticipation would have on individual participants. The primary func-
tion of participation in these accounts lies in its educative value, its 
capacity to produce a more informed, hence more self-sufficient, citi-
zenry.4 On this view, participation is not necessarily related to con-
structing political consensus. Instead, participation may be a 
mechanism for self-expression and the participatory forum becomes a 
place for disputation. Others express more concern for the social wel-
fare effects of participation. Their argument suggests that participa-
* Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A. 1972, Amherst College; J.D. 1975, University 
of Michigan. - Ed. I owe thanks to Kathy Abrams, Ann Gellis, James Krier, William Page, 
Carol Rose, Lawrence Sager, and participants in faculty workshops at Boston University School 
of Law, Indiana University School of Law, and the University of Virginia Law School for com· 
ments on earlier drafts. Richard Bonnie, Douglas Leslie, and Donald Regan provided helpful 
conversation on particular sections. The Gordon Public Policy Center at Brandeis University 
provided a stimulating environment for research. 
1. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Rose, Planning 
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837 
(1983). 
2. See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
3. For general reviews of the classical literature of participation, see P. BACHRACH, THE 
THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELmSM (1967); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY (1970); J. PENNOCK & J. CHAPMAN, NOMOS XVI: PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS (1975). 
4. While several writers stress the individual benefits of participation, they do not necessarily 
agree on the substance of those benefits. John Stuart Mill argued that the educative benefits of 
political participation would generate substantial carryover into purely personal affairs. See C. 
PA TEMAN, supra note 3, at 28-30. Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, viewed political participa· 
tion as a good unto itself, essential to the achievement of "public happiness." The public realm 
in which politics took place was "the only place where men could show who they really and 
inexchangeably were.~· H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 41 (1958). 
930 
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tion will create a communitarian atmosphere in which decisions 
transcend individual interest and reflect instead the interdependence of 
those who constitute the community.5 
These justifications converge, however, in their recognition that 
meaningful participation cannot occur in the national polity.6 The 
role of individuals at that level consists primarily of selecting repre-
sentatives who serve as actual decisionmakers. The conventional re-
sponse has been to look to relatively small units of government, 
localities, to serve as the forums for public participation. Even at the 
local level, however, direct participation in the political process seems 
anomalous. The town meeting model of government has little applica-
tion to contemporary municipalities, and even the Jeffersonian appeal 
to tum the counties into wards7 seems inappropriate for the wide vari-
ety of local problems that require regional or interjurisdictional 
solutions. 
Advocates of increased mass participation, therefore, generally rec-
ommend mechanisms more passive than direct entry into the public 
forum by large numbers of citizens. Most frequently, commentators 
5. See, e.g .• B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 
(1984); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Frug, supra note I. The 
immediate precursor to recent expressions of this sentiment is the Port Huron Statement issued 
by Students for a Democratic Society in 1962. Port Huron Statement, reprinted in J. MILLER, 
"DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS": FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO 329 app. 
(1987). That document bemoaned the isolation of individuals that could mean "the rise of a 
democracy without publics," and concluded: "With the great mass of people structurally remote 
and psychologically hesitant with respect to democratic institutions, those institutions themselves 
attenuate and become ... progressively less accessible to those who aspire to serious participation 
in public affairs." Id. at 336. Miller's book provides a good history of the Port Huron Statement. 
The distinction between the two justifications for participation may be more subtle than I 
have suggested. Mill, for instance, clearly believed that increased participation would induce 
other-regarding behavior. C. PATEMAN, supra note 3, at 29-30. Arendt also believed that pri-
vate interests would be tempered by participation in the public realm. H. ARENDT, ON 
REVOLUTION 256-57 (1963). See also note 82 infra. Nevertheless, the communitarian writers 
explicitly reject the individualistic liberalism that serves as the starting point for Mill and his 
successors. 
6. See generally R. DAHL & E. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973). There are, however, 
occasional arguments for national referenda. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 5, at 281-89. 
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), reprinted in MEMOIR, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (f. Ran-
dolph ed. 1830). Jefferson urged the "subdivision of our counties into wards" in a proposed 
constitution for Virginia and analogized wards to the hundreds created prior to the Norman 
invasion. In Jefferson's model, each ward would comprise approximately six square miles and 
would provide its own company of militia and police force. In short, "each ward would thus be a 
small republic within itself, and every man in the state would thus become an acting member of 
the common government, transacting in person a great portion of it's [sic] rights and duties, 
subordinate indeed, yet important, and entirely within his competence." Id. 
For a modern defense of the town meeting model of democracy, see J. MANSBRIDGE, BE-
YOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980). 
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suggest plebiscitary processes - initiatives and referenda8 that permit 
direct legislation without requiring gatherings in which all deci-
sionmakers meet simultaneously. Proponents of these processes pre-
sume that plebiscites accommodate participation within the 
constraints of technical feasibility. The plebiscite, however, is not 
without its detractors, even among those othenvise sympathetic to 
participatory processes. These objections take a variety of forms, but 
they make essentially the same claim: Plebiscitary processes are less 
likely than representative ones to generate decisions that reflect com-
mon conceptions of the public interest or social welfare.9 In this arti-
cle I consider that comparative claim and conclude that, at least in 
discrete areas with identifiable characteristics, criticisms of plebiscites 
both understate the capacity of participation and overstate the capac-
ity of legislative processes to serve public interest. 
By "public interest" I do not mean a single conception of the good 
on which all informed individuals would agree. Instead, I mean to 
suggest that individual decisionmakers acting in the public interest 
would be able to justify their decisions by reference to the resulting 
increased welfare for society at large. 10 Obviously, very different re-
sults, each of which could be justified in terms of the "public interest," 
could be advocated under this definition. For instance, a decision to 
concentrate municipal services in the wealthy area of town could be 
supported by arguing that productivity of public resources is thereby 
being maximized, or attacked by contending that redistributional ef-
fects are thereby being sacrificed.11 Indeed, the concept is rendered 
even more nebulous if each individual's conception of "public interest" 
is informed by belief about what would serve his or her private inter-
est.12 My definition of "public interest," however, does contain some 
substantive requirements, primarily by excluding certain conduct or 
motives. 13 It would, at a minimum, preclude decisionmaking predi-
8. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after 
Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 341, 403. 
A referendum is a popular vote approving or disapproving prior legislative action. An initia-
tive is a popular vote to enact a law without additional legislative action. 
9. See J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 37-42 (1983) (general litany of objections to participatory 
processes). 
10. See R. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1966). Cf Macey, Promoting Public-Re-
garding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 223, 228 n.29 (1986) (defining "public-regarding legislation" by reference to procedure 
used in legislative passage of law). 
11. See Behrman & Craig, The Distribution of Public Services: An Exploration of Local Gov-
ernmental Preferences, 77 AM. EcoN. REv. 37 (1987). 
12. See J. ELSTER, supra note 9, at 148-57 (self-interest may generate self-deception and thus 
distort beliefs from what would otherwise be inferred from available evidence). 
13. There are other situations in which commentators have attempted to define nebulous 
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cated solely on Elster's "interest-induced beliefs" I4 or what 
Schumpeter termed "extrarational or irrational prejudice and im-
pulse." IS Further, legislation predicated on public interest typically 
attempts to frustrate efforts to expropriate wealth from others to sat-
isfy the desires of the expropriator rather than to achieve net social 
benefits. But legislation motivated by public interest need not involve 
conflicts among competing interests; it may also consider issues on 
which there exists basic agreement about optimal results, but on which 
coordination of individual efforts is frustrated by mistrust or transac-
tional obstacles. The result of such coordination failure is the attain-
ment of a social result favored by none of the society's members. 
Thus, I understand "public interest" broadly (if vaguely) to comprise 
behavior that minimizes expropriation (rent-seeking) or maximizes 
coordination. 
At one level, the critics' conclusion that plebiscites are less likely 
than representative processes to solve problems of expropriation and 
coordination seems seriously counterintuitive. Insofar as public inter-
est is considered to reflect the aggregate of individual interests, direct 
democracy would appear tautologically to provide a superior means 
for registering and implementing social welfare functions. Even if we 
acknowledge substantial doubt about whether any voting procedure 
can reflect actual aggregate preferences - because aggregation proce-
dures necessarily confuse rankings among preferences - it is unclear 
that the problem affects participatory processes more than representa-
tive ones. I6 Indeed, the communitarian perspective on the problem 
suggests not only that decisions made under direct democracy will re-
flect the aggregate interests of constituents, but that those decisions 
will be informed by increased regard for others that is unavailable 
where representation isolates individuals from politics.I7 Implicit in 
the critique of plebiscites, therefore, is the belief that something more 
than mere aggregation is required to reach optimal social decisions. 
Some of these concerns appear to be predicated on an understanding 
that universal and rational pursuit of self-interest does not necessarily 
legal phrases as "excluders." See, e.g., Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the 
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 196 (1968). 
14. J. ELSTER, supra note 9, at 148-57. 
15. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPlTALlSM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 262 (1976). 
16. Compare w. RIKER, LlBERALlSM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN 
THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (arguing that the 
possibility of manipulation and ambiguous results renders democratic voting procedures essen-
tially meaningless), with Coleman & Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6 (1986) 
(suggesting representative processes are susceptible to similar criticisms). 
17. See, e.g., B. BARBER, supra note 5, at 197-98; M. SANDEL, supra note 5, at 172-73. 
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generate an optimal collective result. 18 Self-interested incentives to 
free ride, to overuse common property, 19 or otherwise to expropriate 
the wealth of others for personal gain lie at the root of what Russell 
Hardin has so aptly termed "the back of the invisible hand."20 But 
others skeptical of achieving public interest are less concerned with the 
ability of citizens to act in an other-regarding fashion than with the 
ability (of even the most well-meaning) to act in a manner that reflects 
any consistent, rational calculus of public welfare. Obstacles may 
emerge from preferences that are either uninformed or informed by 
erroneous or irrational concepts. 21 Individuals may have adapted 
their preferences either to existing circumstances or to circumstances 
that they believe readily achievable rather than to ideal situations that 
would be preferred after a comprehensive search of alternatives;22 they 
may adhere to preferences out of addiction rather than through ra-
tional contemplation of alternatives;23 they may form preferences 
predicated on a belief that what they do not currently possess is prefer-
able to what they do possess, a "grass is greener on the other side" 
syndrome.24 Alternatively, they may fail to express their true prefer-
ences in the voting booth, so that electoral results deviate from the 
general will. 
The inquiry into superior modes of decisionmaking, then, recog-
nizes these defects of coordination failure, expropriation, and irration-
. ality and asks whether participatory or representative processes best 
neutralize their effects. It may well be that a perfect direct democracy 
- in which all affected parties meet to debate and resolve an issue -
would best accomplish this goal. Communal decisionmaking on signif-
icant matters might advance both objectives of limiting opportunistic 
behavior and increasing rationality. Discussion incident to decision-
making might produce recognition of and confrontation with irra-
tional motives and prejudices. Responsibility for a wide variety of 
substantive matters might also induce individuals to step forward and 
register their (now rationally informed) preferences.25 For current 
18. See F. FROHOCK, RATIONAL ASSOCIATION 20-30 (1987). 
19. But see Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherelltly Public 
Property, 53 u. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
20. R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1982). 
21. See J. ELSTER, supra note 9, passim. 
22. Id. at 109-11; H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 64-66 (3d ed. 1976); March, 
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978). 
23. J. ELSTER, supra note 9, at 120-21; A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRI-
VATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC ACTION 101-02 (1982). 
24. J. ELSTER, supra note 9, at 123-24. 
25. Certainly this is part of the claim made by Benjamin Barber for "strong democracy," 
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purposes, I am willing to be agnostic, even supportive, of these objec-
tives. Indeed, should they be achieved, many of the conclusions that I 
reach in this article - particularly those dependent on assumptions of 
self-interested actors - would be diluted. But the objections to plebi-
scites and, I hope to show, the responses to those objections rely on 
less utopian conceptions of human nature and less complete realiza-
tions of participatory democracy. The assumption of self-interest does 
not mean that individuals will not consider the interests of others in 
deciding a course of conduct, but only that such behavior must ulti-
mately be induced by appeals to self-interest. Furthermore, retaining 
the assumption of self-interest appears the only way to avoid a 
nontautological resolution of the objections to referendum and initia-
tive. For those objections similarly rely on assumptions about self-
interested actors. If we reject that assumption, the debate over the 
propriety of plebiscites quickly approaches closure with a stalemate 
over underlying assumptions. Granting the presence of self-interested 
actors permits the debate to proceed along common ground. 
My focus on plebiscites, rather than on full realizations of direct 
democracy, is similarly based on a desire to avoid falsely utopian solu-
tions and to consider the most compelling arguments against partici-
pation. Representative government is too entrenched, and arguably 
too vital, for us to believe that anything approaching direc.t democracy 
is feasible, even at the local level. Referendum and initiative appear to 
be the only meaningful halfway houses available to localities that de-
sire some increased popular role. Thus, the objections to participatory 
democracy do not necessarily reject either the educative or communi-
tarian goals sought by advocates of participation.26 Instead, they rely 
on the consequences of satisfying these goals incompletely. In essence, 
these objections contend that if the ideals of increased participation 
cannot be perfectly realized, it does not necessarily follow that en-
hancement of as much democracy as is possible under current circum-
stances is a desirable alternative. This argument, obviously related to 
the economic theory of the second best, 27 suggests that pockets of pub-
lic participation may produce results inferior to those of a wholly rep-
characterized by "common talk" and "common decision." See B. BARBER, supra note 5, at 204, 
224. 
26. But see J. ELSTER, supra note 9, at 40-41 (participation may mean conformity to a bad 
result). Concern about conformity also appears to underlie George Kateb's argument that direct 
democracy requires too much "citizenship" in a manner that reduces individual diversity and 
imposes a "moral cost" of "the death of autonomy." See Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of 
Representative Democracy, 91 ETHICS 357, 373 (1981). 
27. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 86-88 (1970); Lipsey & Lancaster, The 
General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956). 
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resentative system. If plebiscites provide opportunities for individuals 
to register preferences, but fail to provide the educative atmosphere 
that underlies arguments for increased participation, then popularly 
obtained results, predicated on irrationality and self-interested desires 
to expropriate or eschew cooperation, might deviate substantially from 
any conception of public interest. 
The implications of imperfect democracy have generated several 
objections to plebiscites. What I find interesting, however, is that the 
primary objections substantially conflict with one another. On the one 
hand, those who oppose direct democracy argue that plebiscites per-
mit the most tyrannical form of majoritarianism. Plebiscites take an 
undifferentiated view of preferences, so individuals may vote their 
prejudices, free from the constraints of reasoned conversation, and 
have those biases respected as preferences to be aggregated along with 
all others.28 The raw aggregations are, allegedly, likely to ignore the 
interests of the minority. These claims can reach absurd proportions, 
portraying voters as unique among decisionmakers in their capacity 
for venality and malice. 29 
Simultaneously, other opponents claim that plebiscites can too eas-
ily be captured by special interests that substitute minority objectives 
for majoritarian goals. 30 Here the concern is that participatory legisla-
tive processes are initiated and financed by groups to serve their per-
sonal interests, but not necessarily the public interest. According to 
this strand of antiparticipatory thought, these expropriators are capa-
ble of capturing the electorate, convincing some that their proposals 
will serve the voters' interests, while those who remain unpersuaded 
are affected too slightly by the outcome to register any preference at 
all. Indeed, some commentators endorse both objections, apparently 
oblivious to their inherent conflict. Thus, Derrick Bell has expressed 
concern about the tendency of popular democracy for "majority dicta-
28. See D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1984); Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of 
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978); Bell, The Refere11dum: 
Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); Sirico, The Co11stitutio11ality 
of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IOWA L. REV. 637, 641 (1980). 
29. See, e.g., Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881 (1970). Seeley argues that "the referendum differs 
from other legislative methods because it provides a procedure whereby legislative decisions can 
be made exclusively along the lines of racial prejudice." Id. at 902. One wonders what nonracial 
motivations generated the variety of laws concerning miscegenation and public facility segrega· 
tion that were passed by legislators. 
30. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 28, at 8; Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot 
Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. 
REV. 505 (1982). 
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torship,"31 but simultaneously feared the use of referendum by "rela-
tively small, organized groups,"32 the capabilities of which, one might 
imagine, would actually facilitate the interests of the racial minorities 
that Bell wishes to foster. 33 
I believe these objections are not only contradictory, but largely 
overstated. My negative reaction is predicated on a belief that we rely 
on representatives to render decisions not because they are innately 
fairer or more other-regarding than their constituents, but because the 
representative process provides numerous checks on purely selfish 
conduct. 34 The availability in the plebiscitary process of similar 
checks on the conduct of constituents generally, or - more precisely 
- of those constituents who are likely to vote in a referendum or initi-
ative, would substantially close the gap between the quality of par-
ticipatory and representative decisionmaking. This is not to say that 
the decisions will be the same; nor is it to suggest that there is no 
reason to favor one process over the other. If nothing else, a desire to 
reduce transaction costs or to facilitate monitoring of decisionmakers 
may militate in favor of a representative procedure. 35 If we consider 
legislators to be lawmaking specialists, we might best be served by al-
locating that function to them while the laity pursues its own special-
ties. 36 But if we can discover checks on expropriation or irrationality, 
or incentives for coordination within participatory processes, the sys-
tematic disfavoring of plebiscites as supportive of immoral or narrowly 
considered results would be unwarranted. 
In the next Part of this article, therefore, I will suggest that the 
concern for raw majoritarianism fails to consider the costs associated 
with voting in a plebiscite, costs that make it unlikely that the majority 
will vote at all. I shall therefore explore whether the electorate, or that 
part of it most likely to vote in a plebiscite, is also likely to consider 
the public interest. Here I will argue that public choice theory inade-
31. Bell, supra note 28, at 16. 
32. Id. at 15 n.54. 
33. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (arguing that 
"discrete and insular minorities" can and do organize effective interest groups). 
34. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). 
Jonathan Macey suggests that judicial review may serve a similar function. See Macey, supra 
note 10. 
35. See Coleman & Ferejohn, supra note 16, at 9. For an argument that agency costs im-
posed by representation are not major, see Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Vot-
ing, 27 J.L. & ECON. 181 (1984). Other reasons exist for occasionally favoring a legislative 
process. See text at notes 109-10 infra. 
36. However, there is some evidence that those who draft the language of plebiscites are also 
"professionals" or specialists in the subject matter at issue. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 28, at 
60; Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 551-52: 
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quately distinguishes between individual motivations to undertake an 
action (voting) at all and motivations to implement that action in a 
specific way (deciding how to vote). Consequently, the theory fails to 
consider the circumstances in which we would anticipate other-re-
garding behavior in the voting booth. My analysis, however, recog-
nizes that participation for some may be driven by intense self-interest 
in results that are contrary to the public interest. Part II concludes, 
therefore, with an inquiry into whether these tendencies for noncoop-
eration or expropriation can be neutralized in plebiscites that exhibit 
particular characteristics. 
Part III considers the 'negative implication of the argument that 
majorities fail to vote, i.e., that special interests can readily capture the 
electorate. Those who have most to gain from legislation will be moti-
vated to act, at least if their group is capable of overcoming obstacles 
of free riding. 37 I recognize that the threat of minority legislation does 
exist; but those who criticize plebiscites on this basis fail to consider 
the possibility of constraints on those who favor a referendum. I sug-
gest that state constitutional, statutory, and judicial limits on the refer-
endum are properly understood as restricting plebiscites to issues that 
exhibit the salient features that generate publicly interested results. 
Further, I argue that the objection ignores the extent to which legisla-
tures are similarly susceptible to entreaties of special interest groups. 
If the legislature is as or more likely than the general electorate to be 
captured by special interests, then the fear that plebiscites will gener-
ate inordinate special interest legislation is unfounded. 
The prior paragraphs suggest that claims about plebiscites are 
comparative. Those who oppose direct democracy do not contend 
that legislative processes consistently produce optimal results. Nor do 
they argue that those voting in plebiscites are motivated solely by prej-
udice. Rather, the implicit claim is that representative democracy is 
likely to produce results that deviate less from optimal outcomes than 
plebiscitary processes. One would imagine, then, that my contrary 
claim is susceptible to empirical demonstration. Alas, I can make 
none. As I have suggested above, the vagueness of the "public inter-
est" standard defies the creation of a common metric by which one 
could easily measure representative or plebiscitary deviations from the 
ideal. Thus, I have attempted neither to count cases of public or pri-
vate interest legislation nor to devise an experiment that those more 
37. See W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 90-93 (1952). 
On the effects of group size, see N. FROHLICH, J. OPPENHEIMER & o. YOUNG, POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE GOODS 145-50 (1971); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 43-52 (1965); R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 38-49. . 
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empirically minded might employ. My objective instead is to indicate 
the existence of incentives in the legislative and plebiscitary processes 
that would tend to favor conduct consistent with public or private 
interest. 
II. RAW MAJORITARIANISM 
Each of the primary arguments against participatory processes 
(raw majoritarianism and the advent of special interest legislation) im-
plicitly premises its conclusion that plebiscites are insidious on the 
belief that, as a relative matter, voters (though not necessarily repre-
sentatives) are narrowly self-interested and that their representatives 
(though not necessarily voters) overcome self-interest through the rep-
resentational process. In consequence, voters are likely to surrender to 
unreasoned prejudice and narrow conceptions of self-interest where 
legislators would not. The likelihood that majorities will act in this 
manner is increased by the perception that voters, being unaccounta-
ble to others for their expressed preferences and able to vote privately 
and without public justification, will eschew the deliberative processes 
that presumably characterize legislative lawmaking. Rather than be-
coming educated and engaging in reasoned debate over issues, voters 
will - on this view - vote what Schumpeter called their "dark 
urges."38 Majorities that share similar prejudices or interests will be 
able to impose their will on minorities without constraint, even though 
the injuries consequently suffered by the minority outweigh the bene-
fits to the majority. Coalitions of like-minded voters, therefore, are 
both willing and able to oppress extraneous dissenters. Moreover, vot-
ers will be faced with a binary choice: they can vote for a proposition 
or against it. Unlike legislators, they have no opportunity to effect bar-
gains or compromises that might moderate a proposition's language or 
impact, or make it more palatable. Briefly stated, these are the offen-
38. See J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15. It is difficult to know whether Schumpeter's fears 
would be exacerbated or mollified by participatory processes. His concern was born of a general 
distrust of decisionmaking by those who did not have an immediate interest in the outcome of an 
issue. See id. at 256-62. Nevertheless, the public's lack of interest seemed, for Schumpeter, to 
emerge from the absence of responsibility. It was for this reason that "the typical citizen drops 
down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues 
and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real 
interests." Id. at 262. Arguably, the grant of decisionmaking responsibility to individuals would 
increase their interest in the outcome of an issue and thus engender greater attention to the 
underlying arguments that would affect a rational vote. I am not suggesting that Schumpeter 
would have endorsed greater public participation; he disfavored public participation, including 
expressions of popular opinion intended to influence legislators. See id. at 295. For Schumpeter, 
democracy meant "only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men 
who are to rule them." Id. at 285. See also P. BACHRACH, supra note 3, at 17-21 (arguing that 
Schumpeter's theory reduces democracy from an ideal to a mere "political method"). 
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sive elements of raw majoritarianism. In this Part, I want to examine 
both the premises of this objection to participatory politics and the 
conclusions drawn from those premises. 
It seems helpful, at least at the outset, to grant the underlying as-
sumption that legislators are primarily motivated by the public inter-
est. Substantial learning in public choice theory contradicts this 
assumption and suggests that legislators are motivated by the same 
self-interest that permeates private markets; the only difference is that 
the currency in which legislators trade is not legal tender, but votes 
and political support. Legislators are susceptible to influence from 
groups that can deliver sufficient support to maintain the legislator in 
office or facilitate advance to a more desired office. I do not want to 
minimize the importance of this literature; it addresses, however, the 
issue raised in the succeeding section of this article. For the moment, 
it seems most useful to grant the basic premise that legislators do act 
in accordance with public interest and then investigate the relative ca-
pacity of their constituents for similar conduct. Nevertheless, I shall 
relax that assumption where doing so demonstrates particular disad-
vantages of the representative process. 
A. The Tradition of Anti-Participatory Thought 
The sentiment that participatory government reduces to raw ma-
joritarianism has a long tradition in American political theory. Its ori-
gins trace to Madison's concern for faction, expressed in Federalist 
No. 10. It was through representation that those elected to office, im-
plicitly of superior morality than their constituents, could "refine and 
enlarge the public views."39 It was through the representational pro-
cess, therefore, that the "public voice" could "be more consonant to 
the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves. "40 
While Madison recognized the possibility that "[m]en of factious tem-
pers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs" could attain office and 
betray the public trust, he contended that this result was unlikely in 
the large republic, as "unworthy candidates" would have less success 
in persuading large numbers of voters.41 
Although Madison's concern did not lie with local government 
processes, his argument embodies the view that large republics are bet-
ter able to dilute the effects of faction than small ones, presumably by 
permitting representation of more diverse points of view. The negative 
39. THE FEDERALIST No. IO, at 60 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 60·61. 
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implication of his argument is that the comparative advantage of legis-
lative decisionmaking dissipates at the local level. Legislative bodies 
could be too small to include all interests within the community; the 
constituencies they represent could be too small to reflect the diverse 
interests affected by local action. The result could be domination by a 
particular faction and subsequent corruption, facilitating "a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens."42 Nevertheless, Madi-
sonian theory strongly suggests that representative bodies are neces-
sary, if not sufficient, to transcend faction. Thus, even if Madison 
expressed a preference for "large" rather than "small" republics, one 
may readily infer that the theory prefers small representative bodies to 
local electorates. Only the former contains the filter necessary to bal-
ance interests and frustrate action born of self-interest. Should public-
spirited action be necessary, it is only within the representative body 
that a majority willing to undertake the task can likely be found.43 
Similar sentiment occupies de Tocqueville's conception of the tyr-
anny of the majority. For de Tocqueville, the omnipotence of the ma-
jority served as the greatest threat to freedom in the "American 
republics." Indeed, not even the legislature was to be trusted, as it 
"represents the majority and obeys it blindly."44 But here the idiosyn-
cratic capabilities of local governments appear quite salutary. For de 
Tocqueville, localities form administrative functionaries, necessary to 
execute the directives of centralized authority.45 This administrative 
role, however, also provides a buffer against the excesses of centralized 
government. Thus, de Tocqueville suggests that localities constitute 
pockets of liberty that remain open against laws enacted by an oppres-
sive majority.46 That effect, however, is due to the absence of central-
ized administration rather than the bona fl.des of the populace. On 
that issue, de Tocqueville seems no more sanguine than Madison: "I 
42. Id. at 62. See Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 854-55 (1983). 
43. See H. PITKIN, THE CoNCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195 (1967). Carol Rose has sug-
gested to me that Madison's concern for faction might have led him to favor plebiscites at the 
local level, as local representative bodies could be small enough to permit domination by particu-
lar interests. I believe there is something to this position, as I indicate in Part III of this article. 
Madison, however, appears to have had little affection for plebiscitary democracy, and feared the 
"danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions." See 
THE FEDERALISI', supra note 39, No. 49, at 336 (J. Madison). 
44. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 233 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 1966). 
45. Id. at 241-42. For John Stuart Mill, the role of administrative functionary was appropri-
ate because local bodies and officials could not be trusted with the public welfare beyond activi-
ties that constituted "business purely local," e.g., the paving, lighting, and cleaning the streets of 
a town. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 278-90 (R. McCallum ed. 1946). 
46. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 44, at 241-42. 
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think that the rareness now of outstanding men on the political scene 
is due to the ever-increasing despotism of the American majority."47 
As with Madison, it is not the innate goodness of the people that 
serves public interest; to the contrary, that end is achieved by devising 
institutions capable of frustrating self-interested action. 
The implications of this model of raw majoritarianism underlie 
much of the resistance to the plebiscite. If one seeks socially optimal 
decisions, decisionmaking by uninformed, unaccountable, and 
prejudiced voters runs a distant second to decisionmaking by those 
within the alternative model, i.e., informed, publicly interested legisla-
tors who are constrained by their office to explain their votes and who 
are discouraged from registering preferences prior to considering rele-
vant information.48 This deliberative model of legislative decision-
making is an appealing ideal, and undoubtedly exists to a substantial 
degree.49 Nevertheless, the strength with which it is touted seems odd 
in light of the assumptions that underlie the comparative judgment 
about legislators and voters. For if self-interested voters are not to be 
trusted to select legislation that corresponds to a social optimum, it is 
unclear why their judgment is more commendable in the selection of 
representatives. On its face, it would seem that just as raw majorities 
could pass legislation characterized by prejudice and self-interest, they 
could elect representatives similarly unwilling to engage in the reflec-
tive processes relied on to mitigate electoral narrowness. In the ab-
sence of some assurance that persons running for public office are 
publicly interested, nothing in the process of being a representative 
indicates that narrow self-interest of the constituency will be 
overcome. so 
47. Id. at 237. 
48. The alternative is not limited to legislators. Frederick Schauer documents what he terms 
"contemporary distrust of juries" in free speech cases, so that judges become the proper arbiters 
of what speech is to be protected. See Schauer, The Role of the People i11 First Ame11dme11t 
Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 765-68 (1986). 
49. See, e.g., Kalt & Zupan, Capture a11d Ideology i11 the Eco11omic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 279 (1984). However, the limitations of the deliberative model may be pronounced, 
especially at the state and local level where legislative history is largely nonexistent, legislators 
hold other, full-time jobs, and legislation is frequently passed en masse without debate. See Brif-
fault, Distrust of Democracy (Book Review), 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1347, 1362 (1985). 
50. Hanna Pitkin's reading of Madison suggests that the puzzle is less apparent than I have 
indicated. She concludes Madison is less concerned with the moral or political superiority of 
representatives than with their capacity to withstand action based on factious interests. This 
capacity emerges from the balancing function played by representatives, from their representa-
tion of diverse groups whose interests conflict. The legislature provides a forum in which these 
interests "can be controlled by balancing and stalemating." H. PITKIN, supra note 43, at 195. 
Thus, it is the nature of the institution, rather than the bona tides of the personnel who occupy it, 
that ensures action motivated by public interest. Her reading of Madisonian legislatures pur-
ports to solve the riddle of why we should place substantial faith in representatives when those 
who elect them are distrusted. Her view is more consistent with the model of legislative action 
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Defense. of representative government, therefore, must rest on ben-
efits inherent in the process of serving as a representative. Lawrence 
Sager has captured the underlying sentiment for the comparative bene-
fits of legislators by focusing on their capacity to engage in "a reflec-
tive determination that the action contemplated is fair [and] 
reasonable."51 On this view, it is the unique domain of the legislature 
to deliberate over issues. Plebiscites merely aggregate;52 "there is no 
genuine debate or discussion, no individual record or accountability, 
no occasion for individual commitment to a consistent or fair course of 
conduct."53 Plebiscites occur in staccato fashion on isolated and unre-
lated topics. The myriad issues on which the voters express them-
selves have only coincidental interconnection and provide voters with 
little means to formulate a unified idea of appropriate government ac-
tion. 54 In this conception, legislators, but not voters, consider the rea-
sons for voting in a certain way; engage others in discussion to refine 
their opinions; are moderated by the public exposure of their votes; 
devise cohesive theories of government; and consequently render judg-
ments that have the flavor of public interest. 
That legislation transcends narrow self-interest, however, does not 
necessarily imply that legislators engage in something akin to a Rawl-
sian state of deep reflective equilibrium. Rather, more mundane 
mechanisms promote enactments that satisfy Sager's desire for fairness 
and reasonableness and discourage conduct that deviates substantially 
from the socially beneficial. These checks take the forms of internal 
processes and external filters. Proposals for legislation are subject to a 
series of internal checks that have the effect (if not the purpose) of 
frustrating self-interested enactments. While there are few constraints 
on the introduction of proposed legislation, committee hearings and 
other mechanisms for derailment ensure that' most proposals never 
achieve the status of law. Bicameralism creates additional obstacles 
that must be traversed before legislation can be enacted, discouraging 
that I discuss in the next section of this article. For the moment, I am willing to accept the 
principle, evident elsewhere in Madison, that representatives not only balance, but also tran-
scend, self-interest. 
51. Sager, supra note 28, at 1414. Professor Sager's particular concern is with legislation that 
is at odds with constitutional mandates. Thus, the above quotation is followed by the phrase 
"and not at odds with specific prohibitions in the Constitution." Id. But nothing in his analysis 
of plebiscites suggests that he would analyze the propriety of direct democracy differently with 
respect to legislation that clearly fell within constitutional boundaries. At the risk of reading 
Sager too broadly, I will assume that his critique applies equally to nonconstitutional cases. 
52. See, e.g., Kateb, supra note 26, at 371 ("Representation is not there to provide openings 
for social and economic inequality to turn into political inequality: the politics of direct democ-
racy is pure numbers."). 
53. Sager, supra note 28, at 1414-15. 
54. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 227-28 (1976). 
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propositions that lack broad support. While the check of bicamera-
lism finds less acceptance at the local level, even there individual legis-
lators can accomplish little on their own. Without coalitions or 
alliances, the single legislator will be unable to translate self-interest 
into law. This need for cooperative effort has several effects. Support 
is unlikely to be forthcoming unless the measure at issue has broad 
appeal. Proposals that deviate substantially from the public interest 
are likely to fail or at least to be diluted as a compromise, necessary to 
capture majority support, is struck. Logrolling ensures that compro-
mise will dilute the most extreme versions of proposals. The require-
ment of public voting and public explanation restricts the capacity of 
legislators to vote either their own dark urges or those of their constit-
uents. Even if legislators represent a biased constituency, the argu-
ment suggests, the requirements of public explanation will inhibit the 
expression of these sentiments and will induce votes that transcend 
narrow interests. Finally, the courts serve as an external constraint on 
legislators. 55 
The issue, then, is not deliberativeness alone. Instead, deliberation 
is only one mechanism (albeit a very effective one) for deterring self-
interested legislation. 56 But if that is the case, then deliberation, while 
sufficient to induce socially optimal decisions, is not necessary. Thus, 
even if we could not guarantee an equivalent level of deliberation in 
the plebiscite, it is by no means clear that alternative mechanisms 
more readily available to participatory processes could not fill the void 
and provide similar, if not superior, assurances. 
B. Theories of Voting and Their Limits 
The search for a functional equivalent of legislative deliberation 
may begin with easy answers, if only to indicate their chimerical na-
ture. One response to raw majoritarianism is to contend that plebi-
scites at the local level have little effect on societal welfare because 
those adversely affected can move to more congenial localities, the 
availability of which also underlies de Tocqueville's esteem for decen-
tralized administration. On this conception, exit from a locality that 
55. See Macey, supra note 10. 
56. Of course, deliberation may be useful in its own right. Just as public participation is 
considered to be an educative process for participants, so may legislators grow and develop 
through their own deliberations. Thus, deliberation is to be encouraged. But those who favor 
legislative over plebiscitary processes do not value deliberation because of its effect on individual 
legislators. Rather, their concern is with the instrumental effects of deliberation, le., its capacity 
to deter narrowly interested legislation. To the extent that other checks in the lawmaking pro-
cess produce the same result, there is little reason for the pure instrumentalist to favor one over 
the other. 
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has acted invidiously is largely salutary, as it informs the original mu-
nicipality that its policies require reform. 57 The problem with this re-
sponse is not simply the obvious objection that some people do not 
have the resources to vote with their. feet. (Indeed, I shall argue in the 
next section that the inability to leave is a catalyst for conduct - voice 
or complaint - with an aura of public interest. 58) Rather, the related, 
though subtly different point that undercuts this argument is that mu-
nicipalities do not provide a single good, the dilution or absence of 
which would generate substantial discontent. Instead, municipalities 
provide packages of goods or services, the total of which attracts po-
tential residents.59 Thus, even those who object to a plebiscite that 
alters a particular service are unlikely to exercise an exit option (or 
even a voice option) as long as there remains some net benefit from 
other local services that exceeds the benefit obtainable elsewhere. 
The need for deliberation or some equivalent, then, appears to be 
essential to the plebiscite's credibility as a mechanism for political 
decisionmaking. Certainly there is nothing that precludes voters from 
deliberation about the issues before them. The critics of plebiscites 
appear only to contend that voters will not take advantage of their 
opportunities for thoughtful discussion. Mill, on the other hand, be-
lieved that only the ballot could generate sufficient popular interest in 
political matters to induce participation in "political discussion, and 
collective political action."60 This view seems overly optimistic about 
57. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 21-29 (1970). Departure from the 
locality would constitute selection of the exit option. Those who remain may still work for polit-
ical reform, thereby exercising the voice option. The availability of exit also ensures a wide array 
of choice for residents by making available municipalities with different characteristics. Thus 
individuals can migrate to the locality whose services best reflect individual preferences. The 
classic work suggesting that exit could produce an optimal allocation of municipal services 
(though employing a different jargon) is Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
POL. EcoN. 416 (1956). For a discussion of adverse effects that may be generated by emigration 
(e.g., reduction of subsidies for those who remain), see Buchanan & Goetz, Efficiency Limits of 
Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. Pua. EcoN. 25 (1972). 
58. See text at notes 155-59 infra. 
59. See Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Municipal Services (Book Review), 
100 HARV. L. REV. 946 (1987) (municipalities' function as providers of a package of services 
renders difficult the argument that municipalities are obligated to provide equal service to all 
residents). 
60. J.S. MILL, supra note 45, at 211. Mill elaborated: 
It is by political discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is a routine, and 
whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or 
ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events which take place far off, have a most sensible 
effect even on his personal interests; and it is from political discussion, and collective polit-
ical action, that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round 
himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow-citizens, and becomes consciously a member of 
a great community. But political discussions fly over the heads of those who have no votes, 
and are not endeavouring to acquire them. 
Id. 
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the effects of the ballot in at least two respects. It is by no means clear 
that those without a vote would be disinterested in the outcome of 
public affairs that otherwise affect their lives. 61 Indeed, the very ab-
sence of the vote might lead such individuals to engage in increased 
political action as their only recourse for influencing political deci-
sions. Perhaps more importantly, however, both Mill's testimonial to 
the benefits of voting and the conflicting claims of raw majoritarianism 
fail to consider the empirical observation that large numbers of those 
who hold the franchise fail to exercise it, especially on matters submit-
ted to plebiscitary approval. 
Voter apathy is typically explained by reference to self-interest, i.e., 
the personal costs of voting exceed personal benefits.62 That same ex-
planation, however, complicates explanations of the existence of sub-
stantial numbers of voters on any given issue. For if potential voters 
are, indeed, narrowly self-interested, it would appear that they would 
avoid the voting booth altogether. Individuals motivated by self-inter-
est will vote only if that act produces benefits greater than those they 
could accrue through an alternative use of the same resources, e.g., 
time, effort, and financial outlays incurred in going to the voting 
booth. Particularly for those in the majority, voting is unlikely to pro-
duce individual benefits in excess of costs (including opportunity 
costs). Even if social benefits of voting exceed the aggregate of individ-
ual costs expended in the process, the unlikelihood that the marginal 
voter will make a difference to the outcome suggests that rational, nar-
rowly self-interested individuals could abstain and ride freely on the 
efforts of others. 63 This, of course, is a manifestation of the well-
known collective action problem that materializes whenever an actor 
create$ positive spillover effects from which the beneficiaries cannot be 
excluded. One would think that the incentive to abstain felt by a po-
tential voter perceiving herself to be in the majority would be even 
more significant, because the advantage she can gain by voting her 
preferences is even less than what a member of the minority might 
obtain. It is for this reason that we often hear candidates with large 
61. For instance, at the time when eighteen-year-olds had no right to vote but an obligation 
to serve in the armed forces, few could reasonably contend that males in that age group were 
disinterested in political decisions to introduce the military into combat. 
62. See, e.g., A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-74 (1957); F. FRO-
HOCK, supra note 18, at 76. 
63. Where elections are close, so that voters get positive utility from voting because it might 
affect outcomes, voters are more likely to engage in deliberative processes and thereby bring 
participatory processes closer to the deliberative ideal of the representative process. See D. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 122 (1979) (discussing literature that suggests voter participation is 
positively correlated to closeness of election). I consider cases of "close" elections to be aberra-
tional for purposes of this article, and thus place my argument for plebiscites on other grounds. 
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leads in pre-election polls urging their followers not to take victory for 
granted on election day. The assumption underlying these exhorta-
tions may evolve from something like a theory of the diminishing mar-
ginal utility of voting: a vote is worth more to the voter who believes 
his views coincide with those of a minority than to the voter who be-
lieves his views coincide with those of a majority.64 If this is correct, 
then the question that we inevitably hear after elections - "Why so 
few voters?" - might properly be recast: "Why so many?" While 
these responses suggest that Mill was overly optimistic about the edu-
cative effects of voting, the presence of voters may also be a source of 
belief in the vitality of deliberative voting in the plebiscite. If the exist-
ence of substantial voting can be explained by preferences for activities 
that foster deliberative or other forms of checks on self-interest, then 
plebiscitary practices may be less objectionable than the argument 
from raw majoritarianism suggests. It is to the possibility of such an 
explanation that I want to tum. First, however, it is necessary to elim-
inate alternative explanations for voting. 
Traditional explanations for collective action in the face of free rid-
ing opportunities cannot similarly account for the phenomenon of vot-
ing. For instance, a substantial amount of collective action is 
explained by the use of individualized and excludable by-products that 
accompany (and thus induce) participation in the collective (e.g., a 
magazine that is sent to dues-paying members).65 These by-products 
may raise the individual benefits of collective action sufficiently to jus-
tify the commensurate cost. In the voting arena, however, the use of 
by-products to induce participation is largely precluded by laws 
against vote selling. Even those who gather mementos of political sup-
port - l;mmper stickers, pins, and funny hats - may do so without 
actually voting for the candidate whom they support. 
Alternatively, collective action problems are often overcome by the 
presence of an entrepreneur who seeks personal gain from action that 
confers collective benefits on others.66 This opportunity, however, is 
similarly unavailable to individual voters, who are the recipients, 
rather than the creators, of public goods that materialize through en-
64. See w. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 57 
(1973); Meehl, The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument, 71 AM. PoL. 
Sci. REV. 11 (1977). The diminution in valuation may occur only after the voter believes that a 
fifty percent threshold has been exceeded. 
65. See, e.g., R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 31-35; see also Barry, Political Participation as 
Rational Action, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY 53, 61-64 (B. Barry & R. Har-
din eds. 1982). 
66. See R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 35-37; N. FROHLICH, J. OPPENHEIMER & 0. YOUNG, 
supra note 37, at 7-8. 
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trepreneurship. Finally, there may be a discrete subgroup whose 
members would receive sufficient benefits from a particular action that 
it is worth their while to incur all the costs of the action, although 
noncontributors would also benefit. 67 In such a case, only envy or 
spite would prevent self-interested actors from pursuing a course of 
action. 68 Once again, however, the voting arena provides little oppor-
tunity for the interested subgroup. Even the individual who will ob-
tain the greatest benefit from an electoral vote, the politician who wins 
an election as representative, has only a single vote. Even at the local 
level, it is unlikely that the "spoils" available to a successful candidate 
will be sufficient to explain a substantial percentage of votes cast. 
Thus, the presence of individuals who would benefit personally from 
the public good of voting fails to explain the phenomenon of mass 
voting that places the successful candidate in office in the first 
instance. 
Others have attempted to explain voting by relaxing the assump-
tion that individual voters are motivated by self-interest. These expla-
nations vary in their persuasiveness. One possibility is that individuals 
make ideological decisions to vote. Much of our political culture is 
directed at creating a duty to participate through the act of voting, 
even though personal costs may otherwise exceed personal benefits. 69 
We are told, for instance, that we have no grounds for complaint 
about government policies if we failed to take advantage of opportuni-
ties to alter those policies, even though an additional vote would be 
most unlikely, even at the local level, to have affected the substance of 
those decisions. But appeals to duty fail readily to separate those who 
vote from those who do not. There is, for instance, no sense that those 
who vote otherwise fulfill socially imposed duties (to family, country, 
or neighbors) and that those who do not vote ignore those duties. 
Utilitarian or consequentialist explanations of voting are also un-
satisfying. Derek Parfit, for instance, suggests that voting for a supe-
rior candidate is usually a rational act for the consequentialist because 
the expected value of even a single voter's contribution is positive. 10 
Similarly, Brian Barry argues that a utilitarian would participate 
67. See M. TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 10 (1987); R. HARDIN, supra note 
20, at 40-42. 
68. This is not to minimize the effects of spite, which may indeed prevent actors from engag· 
ing in conduct that would return net personal benefits. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite -
The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970). 
69. See A. DOWNS, supra note 62, at 267-68; Ashenfelter & Kelley, Jr., Determi11a11ts of 
Participation in Presidential Elections, 18 J.L. & ECON. 695, 724 (1975); Barry, supra note 65, at 
60. . 
70. See D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 73.75 (1985). 
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(vote) whenever individual net marginal benefits were positive, which 
must be the case when social net marginal benefits are positive. Other-
wise, one would be confronted with the anomaly _that the sum of net 
negative individual contributions would be a social positive. In order 
to avoid the anomaly it must be individually worthwhile to contribute 
whenever the contribution is worthwhile to society.71 
The consequentialist arguments, however, are less compelling than 
they appear at first glance. Even if Parfit is correct that the expected 
value of a vote is positive, its absolute value may be insignificant. The 
individual voter, therefore, may be able to bring about a greater ex-
pected value by making an equivalent investment in some activity 
other than voting. Assume, for instance, that the cost of voting to a 
utilitarian was $X and that the expected net value of the vote (ex-
pected value less $X) was $5. That would be the case, for instance if 
there were one chance in a million that the utilitarian's vote for a supe-
rior candidate would make the difference between that candidate win-
ning or losing the election, and, if the superior candidate were to win, 
society would be better off (after deducting the costs of voting) by $5 
million. The utilitarian still would not vote if $X could be invested in 
some activity that would return a net value of greater than $5 (includ-
ing the costs of searching for the alternative activity). Perhaps the 
utilitarian would confer greater social rewards by donating $X to 
Oxfam or a local charity. Given the low probability of affecting elec-
tions (Parfit puts the probability of an individual's affecting the out-
come of a presidential election at one in 100 million 72), it is not 
difficult to believe that alternative uses of the same money would re-
turn greater expected benefit values. 
Barry's utilitarian argument similarly suffers from omitting the ef-
fects of alternative courses of conduct. Again, he suggests that a utili-
tarian should vote if the social effects are positive, because personal 
effects necessarily contribute to the social benefit: "[I]f a hundred-
thousand members count for something, then each one contributes on 
the average a hundred thousandth."73 If it is socially desirable that 
elections be held, then it must be socially desirable for each eligible 
voter to vote. 
Presumably, what makes voting desirable in this sense is that one 
candidate is superior. Thus, if a superior candidate attains 1000 votes 
and an inferior candidate receives 999, each voter in the majority has 
71. Barry, supra note 65, at 61. 
72. D. PARFIT, supra note 70, at 74. 
73. Barry, supra note 65, at 61. 
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contributed one-one thousandth to the greater good. On this view, a 
utilitarian should vote for the superior candidate. But what if the su-
perior candidate attains 1001 votes and the inferior 999? What then 
has been the contribution of the new voter? Is the voter responsible 
for 1/1001 of the benefits? Arguably not, as those same benefits would 
have materialized had the last voter not voted at all. In short, the 
marginal benefit of that voter's participation is zero, even though the 
contributory consequences of the participation are positive.74 Donald 
Regan's argument that the contributory consequences approach to 
utilitarianism leads to highly counterintuitive results75 seems particu-
larly applicable here. If the social consequences that the utilitarian 
desires will be advanced even without his participation, it seems un-
clear why he would be driven to contribute to that result. Indeed, 
given that the same result would obtain without his participation, it 
seems likely that the utilitarian could produce superior total conse-
quences by dedicating his resources to endeavors other than voting 
that would benefit society. 
Correcting the omissions in Parfit's and Barry's analyses leaves the 
conclusion that voting becomes rational only if the subjective76 ex-
pected utility of one's vote (the perceived probability that one's vote 
will be decisive multiplied by the social benefit that will materialize 
should that vote be decisive) exceeds the subjective expected return 
(opportunity costs) of not voting.77 Barry's focus solely on the pro 
rata distribution of ex post responsibility for the outcome ignores both 
this comparison and the fact that casting the decisive vote is highly 
improbable. That improbability means that the expected utility of 
one's vote is likely to be minute; i.e., it is likely to be exceeded by the 
subjective expected return of not voting. 
More advanced theories of participation attempt to solve the para-
dox through sophisticated models that expand the definition of the 
benefits of participation. On this view, participation is not simply a 
means to an end, a device for accomplishing a particular political ob-
jective. Were participation solely a means, participants would be in-
curring personal costs that could be avoided with no loss of personal 
welfare so long as sufficient others continued to pursue the same objec-
tive. If participation is simply a means, in short, it constitutes a pure 
74. Singer, Is Act-Utilitarianism Self-Defeating?, 81 PHIL. REV. 94, 103 (1972). 
75. D. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO·OPERATION 14-15 (1980). 
76. I use subjective expected utility here because the issue is whether a person believes it 
rational for her to vote, not whether it is objectively rational to take that action. 
77. See D. REGAN, supra note 75, at 231. Regan's analysis makes clear that subjective ex· 
pected utility takes into account the anticipated conduct of others. 
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cost item. But if participation produces its own benefits, then the 
calculus underlying the self-interested decision to participate or ab-
stain is significantly altered. Participation becomes not a production 
good, but a consumption good78 that returns its own benefits. Partici-
pation becomes a worthwhile endeavor wholly apart from any benefits 
the voter might receive from the particular result of the political enter-
prise, e.g., an election. Voting, for example, permits the actor to view 
himself and to be viewed by others as a participant in the political 
process. It allows one to share in the pleasures of a particular victory 
or commiserate with others over a defeat. 79 The dramatic effect that 
this conception has on the decision to participate is reflected in 
Hirschman's argument that the benefit of political participation to an 
individual is "not the difference between the hoped-for result and 
the effort furnished by him or her, but the sum of these two 
magnitudes."80 
Although they might assiduously avoid economic terminology, 
many of those who favor increased participation would quickly em-
brace the notion that participation produces benefits to the participant. 
The argument finds its most sympathetic and controversial voice in 
the philosophy of Hannah Arendt, who viewed public participation (a 
term involving, for her, far more than the trivial act of voting) as the 
highest end of life. Indeed, public life was the appropriate response to 
the anguish of life's burdens: "[I]t was the polis, the space of men's 
78. See J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 270-71 (1977). 
79. It has been suggested that consumption benefits are low because most voters, given the 
choice, would prefer to mail ballots than to wait in line at the polling place. See H. MARGOLIS, 
SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM AND RATIONALITY 86 (1982). But as I indicate above, some of the 
consumption benefits may be as obtainable through the former mechanism as through the latter, 
so that presence at the polling place is not an essential feature of obtaining a net personal benefit 
through the participatory process. Further, Margolis's point raises, but does not answer, an 
interesting empirical inquiry. It may be that being seen at the polling booth does return substan-
tial personal benefits (e.g., allowing one to be perceived by others as a public-spirited citizen) and 
thus reflects the presence of substantial consumption benefits. 
80. A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 23, at 86 (emphasis in original). For a critique of the view of 
participation as consumption, see J. EI.STER, supra note 9; Bister, Rationality, Morality, and 
Collective Action, 96 ETHICS 136, 147 (1985). A response to Bister may be found in Hubin, Of 
Bindings and By-Products: Elster on Rationality, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 82, 94-95 (1986). El-
ster's argument seems to be that the benefits of participation are necessarily by-products that can 
arise only as a result of undertaking some independent goal, such as the need to make a decision. 
See J. ELSTER, supra note 9, at 98. I am somewhat puzzled at the notion that one cannot decide 
to participate in a political activity for no reason other than to improve oneself and successfully 
emerge from the activity with an improved political acumen. What may be important to an 
individual is not simply the passage or rejection of a political proposal, but the fact that the 
individual played a role in attempting to bring about a specific result. Thus, one may find partici-
pation exhilarating, even if one is involved in the losing side of the enterprise. Of course, exhila-
ration is not necessarily a good, particularly if it arises simply from participation in a mass 
enterprise, i.e., conformity for its own sake. But saying that participation may generate subop-
timal results is very different from saying that participation can only be viewed as a means for 
generating results of which personal benefits are a by-product. 
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free deeds and living words, which could endow life with splendor."81 
Moreover, it was only at the local level that the mass of individuals 
could fully participate and realize their potential. The representative 
democracy that would be necessary at the national level permits only 
the expression of individuals' interests or welfare; it provides no 
method for consideration of "opinion," formed through active partici-
pation of those represented. 82 This rationale led Arendt to bemoan 
the absence in our constitutional structure of a place where the people 
could exercise the activities of freedom: "expressing, discussing, and 
deciding."83 While the Constitution had empowered citizens against 
the state, it failed to ensure a place for them in the public realm of 
discussion and decisionmaking. Yet "public freedom" was the prereq-
uisite of human freedom. The need for a public realm conjoined with 
its impracticality at the levels to which the Constitution spoke re-
quired localities to seize the role of true republics in which individuals 
could act as citizens. 
But even if we accept the argument that participation returns net 
benefits to participants, the mere act of voting would appear a poor 
mechanism for increasing the welfare of individual voters. The con-
sumption theory has been utili~ed most frequently to explain active 
participation in attempts to influence government policy: lobbying, 
demonstrating, drafting of legislation. 84 Relatively costless public ac-
81. H. ARENDT, supra note 5, at 285. For the most thorough (but not wholly sympathetic) 
analysis of Arendt's views on political action, see G. KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT: POLITICS, 
CONSCIENCE, EVIL (1983). Kateb characterizes Arendt's position on participation as one that 
renders particular outcomes secondary: 
It is participating directly in decisions of the highest importance, of the greatest indefinite· 
ness, that matters; not because one's autonomy is injured without such participation, but 
because one does not achieve full humanity except as an equal partner in the group whose 
decisions shape the common life. If one participates directly, it makes little difference 
whether one is in the majority or minority. 
Id. at 41; see also Benhabib, Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought, 
16 POL. THEORY 29, 44-48 (1988). 
82. H. ARENDT, supra note 5, at 272-73. For Arendt, "[i]nterest and opinion are entirely 
different political phenomena. Politically, interests are relevant only as group interests •••• 
Opinions, on the contrary, never belong to groups but exclusively to individuals . . • . Opinions 
will rise wherever men communicate freely with one another and have the right to make their 
views public .... " Id. at 229. 
Kateb concludes that, for Arendt, "[t]he creation of representative institutions is the death of 
unprofessionalized, unpartisan grass-roots participation in discussions of the highest impor· 
tance." See G. KATEB, supra note 81, at 19. This is not to suggest that Arendt endorsed plebi· 
scites. See text at note 85 infra. 
83. H. ARENDT, supra note 5, at 238 (paraphrasing Thomas Jefferson's letter to Samuel Ker-
cheval (July 12, 1816)). To Arendt, this political place could occur only at the local level. Hence, 
her endorsement of Jefferson's call to "divide the counties into wards." Id. at 252 (quoting 
Jefferson's letter to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824)); see also note 7 supra. 
84. See, e.g., J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 78 (using consumption theory to explain why 
citizens became involved in efforts to control air pollution in California); A. HIRSCHMAN, supra 
note 23. 
April 1988] Plebiscites and Participation 953 
tivities such as voting would seem to return fewer consumption bene-
fits, particularly if we accept Albert Hirschman's formulation that the 
benefit derived from participation equals the sum of expected result 
and effort. It is presumably for this reason that Arendt viewed plebi-
scites as a process that "puts an end to the citizen's right to vote, to 
choose and to control their government."85 Thus, if our primary con-
cern is determining why constituents get into the voting booth, some 
additional explanation must be necessary. 
Alternatively, Hirschman has sought to explain political activity 
(including voting) as an expression of disappointment with the private 
features of our lives. 86 Hirschman sees participation in public life as a 
reaction to the frustrations of private consumption and to a desire for 
radical change. Voting, then, becomes a mechanism for complaint, 
even if the expected efficacy is limited. Voting as complaint becomes a 
consumption good not in Arendt's sense of political participation as 
the highest human activity, but, more earthily, as a means for getting 
our concerns off our individual and collective chests. But if voting 
becomes an expression of protest, it makes sense only where other 
forms of protest, e.g., emigrating to a more congenial environment, are 
relatively costly. Thus, voting fits Hirschman's paradigm of "voice," 
likely to be utilized to express concern about a deteriorating situation 
where "exit" from the situation would entail substantial costs. 87 But 
this theory, too, does little to explain substantial voting. Complaining 
voices may speak with greater frequency and at less cost through alter-
natives to voting, e.g., by writing letters or making telephone calls to 
elected officials or to newspapers. Thus, the occasional exercise of vot-
ing seems to provide little outlet for public complaint. 
C. Beyond the Voting Booth: Deliberative Voting 
There do exist, then, a variety of arguments that do not rely on 
altruism to explain the phenomenon of substantial voting. 88 In isola-
85. H. ARENDT, supra note 5, at 231. 
86. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 23, at 9-24. 
87. Id. at 92-98. 
88. Again, I am attempting to discern nonaltruistic motives for voting in order .to avoid a 
tautological conclusion that those who vote will consider the interests of others in determining 
how to vote. Clearly, if people are willing to expend resources to increase not only their own 
welfare, but also the welfare of others, then voting might be one means of effecting the desired 
result. See H. MARGOLIS, supra note 79; Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The 
Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1341-42 (1986). Indeed, even if voting 
consists of little more than a desire to register a preference, to the extent that that desire is 
motivated by a sense of duty or commitment to a joint enterprise, it may represent activity trig-
gered by concern for others rather than oneself. See Barry, supra note 65, at 60; A. SEN, COL-
LECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 195 (1970); Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the 
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 317, 323-33 (1977). 
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tion, the more convincing among these arguments fail to refute the 
claim that raw majoritarianism is a substantial threat in plebiscitary 
processes. For if individuals have substantial incentives to vote that 
do not emanate from concern for the welfare of others, they likely will 
tum out to record their narrowly self-interested preferences. If that is 
the case, minorities are vulnerable to repressive measures proposed 
through the plebiscitary process. Indeed, if voting is more likely 
among those who obtain personal benefits from the act, bigots with 
strong preferences are more likely to register their preferences than 
more open-minded citizens with a lower intensity of conviction. 
This concern, however, assumes that the reasons voters enter the 
voting booth have no effect on the policies for which they ultimately 
vote. 89 The concern dissipates if inducements to vote are less neutral, 
if the motivations that lure voters to the voting booth simultaneously 
and systematically induce other-regarding behavior.90 The act of vot-
ing ought not to be looked at in isolation, if in fact it is simply part of, 
indeed merely the denouement of, a participatory process. If that pro-
cess includes elements that routinely create checks on self-interested 
legislation and incentives for deliberation analogous to the checks and 
incentives imposed on publicly interested legislators, then perhaps 
widespread voting would not be indicative of raw majoritarianism; on 
the contrary, it would suggest that plebiscitary decisions shared the 
societal perspective assumed to arise from a deliberative legislative 
process. Presumably, this would result because the motivations to 
vote at all simu1taneously induced either deliberation among voters or 
some functional equivalent that similarly deterred narrowly self-inter-
ested conduct. 
Before analyzing these possibilities, I want to address the literature 
that suggests the absence of a correlation between the desire to vote 
and the manner in which the vote is exercised, for these arguments 
implicitly deny that voters deliberate in any meaningful way about 
their electoral choices; Amartya Sen, for instance, has suggested that 
an individual might simply enjoy voting but be indifferent as to alter-
natives for which his vote may be cast. Gratification may be obtained 
through participation in the decisionmaking process, on this view, 
89. For an argument that the decision whether to vote is influenced by factors that vary from 
those affecting the decision how to vote, see Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating 
Political Alternatives, 28 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 185 (1984); Buchanan, Individual Choice 
in Voting and the Market, 62 J. PoL. EcoN. 334 (1954). 
90. Margolis reaches a similar conclusion: "[O]nce the conventional [cost-benefit] analysis 
leads us to the result that voting must ordinarily depend heavily on psychic income, then it 
becomes arbitrary to assume that this psychic income comes only from the act of voting and not 
at all from how [the voter] votes." H. MARGOLIS, supra note 79, at 87. 
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wholly apart from the benefits gained or lost as a result of a particular 
decision. This "indifferent voter" might overcome the disincentives to 
vote, but not deliberate about which way to vote once that decision is 
made. This voter would obtain as much satisfaction from voting based 
on a coin toss as from voting based on contemplation of possible out-
comes. 91 This account of voting, however, fails to explain the source 
of the indifferent voter's delight. If it emerges from a perverse plea-
sure in pulling small levers, or from being seen in public places, Sen 
would be correct. Yet each of these objectives could be satisfied at a 
relatively low cost without undertaking the burdens of voting. In the 
absence of more compelling explanations, we are forced back to the 
initial inquiry into whether obtaining that delight requires more reflec-
tive analysis than Sen's model suggests. 
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan similarly contend that 
even if voters have preferences, there is no reason to presume that 
their "choice in the polling booth reflects or corresponds with . . . 
preference[s] over outcomes."92 They argue that because individual 
voters recognize that their effect on outcomes is likely to be nil, they 
are less likely to vote true preferences. Brennan and Buchanan assert 
that unlike market situations, in which individuals are likely to vote 
true preferences because failure to do so means those preferences will 
be forgone (an inaccurate premise, at least in the case of public goods), 
the opportunity cost of pulling a particular lever is "not a particular 
policy forgone, but simply the other lever or levers unpulled."93 To 
these authors, voters are analogous to sports fans who are primarily 
interested in watching a sports event and have little interest in the 
outcome, other than to " 'adopt' a team for the afternoon, taking on a 
partisan stance as a means of stimulating interest."94 ' 
There are a variety of responses to this argument. The first is a 
reversion to the comparative claim. Even at the local level, the vote of 
any one representative is unlikely to make a difference. Further, since 
public debate and deliberation among representatives prior to voting is 
common, each representative is likely to know prior to voting that his 
or her vote is irrelevant to the outcome. Thus, if inability to affect 
outcomes means members of the electorate are unlikely to reflect their 
true preferences among outcomes, there is similar reason to believe 
that these same motivations exist - at least on some occasions - with 
respect to representatives. Representatives may cast votes contrary to 
91. See A. SEN, supra note 88, at 195-96. 
92. Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 89, at 194. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 186. 
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their preferences because they are relatively unconcerned about the 
issue at hand and wish to exchange their vote with another representa-
tive on an issue of greater personal import.95 
But there is a more fundamental difficulty with Brennan and 
Buchanan's argument. If a voter has a preference for a certain out-
come, once the voter determines on some independent basis to vote at 
all, it is unclear why he or she would not vote that preference even if 
he or she believes the vote will have no impact on the outcome. A 
contrary vote presumably also would have no impact on the outcome. 
Yet - given the decision to vote at all - there is some motivation to 
vote one's preferences, however slight, and little motivation to vote for 
the contrary. Indeed, Sen has suggested that voting may be explained 
simply by a drive to express one's preferences.96 Perhaps some moti-
vation to vote in a manner inconsistent with preferences over out-
comes could exist; Brennan and Buchanan, however, simply do not 
explain what that motivation might be. I can imagine that a voter 
might wish to vote for a candidate even though the voter does not 
favor that candidate's position, if only to send a message of dissatisfac-
tion with alternative choices (e.g., voting for a third-party candidate). 
But even here, the voter is acting in accordance with personal prefer-
ence - to make a Grand Gesture. In the absence of some more com-
pelling explanation, it would appear reasonable to assume that people 
vote in accordance with their preferences over outcomes. That being 
the case, it once again becomes crucial to determine whether, in the 
development of those preferences, voters engage in a process function-
ally equivalent to legislative deliberation. 
I want to be quite clear as to the scope of this claim. I am not 
suggesting that all voters act in an other-regarding manner when they 
step into the voting booth. The existence of self-interested plebiscites 
and their occasional success is sufficient to debunk that proposition. 
My assumption is that self-interest continues to motivate voters, but 
that self-interest in local plebiscitary contexts can generate cooperative 
solutions. Additionally, my claim is comparative. Neither all voters 
nor all legislators are likely to act in a manner that coincides with 
societal interest. The assumption that representative democracy pro-
vides a superior check on divergence from the optimal depends in 
large part on the assumption that representative bodies alone are suffi-
ciently deliberative to temper self-interest. My claim is simply that 
95. If we relax the assumption that representatives always act in the public interest, this 
exchange process might facilitate nonpublic interest legislation, since there would presumably be 
less of a need to trade for votes that truly reflect public interest. 
96. A. SEN, supra note 88, at 195. 
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similar or alternative mechanisms for neutralizing socially suboptimal 
effects of self-interested behavior may be found in certain identifiable 
participatory procedures. 
Analysis of the decision to vote at all suggests some reasons for 
believing that decisions about how to vote involve considerations that 
permit voters to coordinate or to overcome selfish desires. Perhaps the 
easiest case for assuming a relationship between the decisions whether 
to vote and how to vote emerges from the altruism explanation for the 
former. If altruism solves the voter's paradox, a presumption of delib-
eration by the voter appears appropriate. Any different presumption 
would require the incongruous belief that a voter considered the act of 
voting necessary to satisfy obligations towards others in the society, 
but that how one voted was irrelevant to that same task. Assuming 
that voters are at all motivated by altruism, it seems a short step to 
conclude that altruistic motives dictate how they vote. Similarly, if 
voting is explained by a sense of duty, obligation, or beneficence to-
wards others, deliberativeness appears to be an integral part of the 
voting process. It would be anomalous for a potential voter to pro-
claim that he had an obligation to vote, but no similar obligation to 
consider how to vote. Since I have assumed self-interested voters, 
however, I do not want to rest my case on the possibility of voters 
motivated by altruism or a sense of duty. 
Incorporating other-regarding behavior into alternative explana-
tions for voting, however, proves more problematic. In particular, the 
implications of the consumption benefits explanation are quite ambig-
uous. Those benefits, as suggested above,97 are likely to be small since 
they presumably correlate to effort expended, and there is little effort 
attached to the act of voting. Thus, substantially more benefits will 
accrue to those political participants who take an active role in 
campaigning for a position than to those who merely register prefer-
ences in a voting booth. Initially, then, this explanation appears to 
strengthen the possibility that voters vote deliberatively. The likeli-
hood of receiving additional consumption benefits may lead individual 
voters into a variety of forms of political action. These include both 
minor, passive steps such as listening to debates98 and active steps 
such as endorsement of a favored position, leafletting, and organiza-
tional or lobbying activity. Indeed, it may be that the more one en-
gages in political activity, the more "addictive" the benefits become, so 
97. See text at notes 76-84 supra. 
98. My sense that an important element of participation consists of passive conduct is in-
formed by Leo Strauss's remark that "liberal education consists in listening to the conversation 
among the greatest minds." L. STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 7 (1968). 
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that discussion begets further discussion. 99 
The remarkable feature of these activities is that they increasingly 
demand the kind of conversation, advocacy, and analysis that we attri-
bute to legislative deliberation. Voting, on this view, is not the citi-
zen's distinctive act of political participation, but the culmination of a 
variety of other activities. It is, in fact, anticlimactic. Those who 
enter the voting booth are not necessarily blind to the arguments 
against the position that they prefer. Rather, they have rejected those 
arguments after consideration - consideration in which private inter-
est would be tempered by discussion in the public realm. 100 This is not 
to say either that they have rejected the arguments on principled 
grounds, or that those who have deliberated would agree on a result. 
It is only to say that the deliberative process that informs legislators 
has an equivalent in the plebiscitary process, and that the process of 
voting (whether perceived as a cost or benefit) serves as a filter for 
those who have thought about the underlying issues. Participation in 
this deliberative process possesses an evolutionary quality for those in-
volved. Political argument confronts participants with competing 
views, generates new information, demonstrates the irrationality of ini-
tial preferences, and broadens the basis on which to make ultimate 
decisions at the polls. As in the ideal legislature, participatory deci-
sionmaking "does not consist in totaling up previously formed inten-
tions or wills," 101 but in the competition in which positions are 
attacked and defended. 102 The vote serves solely as a tabulation of 
wills as formed at a particular point in this interactive process, 103 but 
is wholly consistent with a perception that the process has been a de-
liberative one. 
Yet there is a darker side to the consumption benefits explanation 
of voting. If self-interest motivates the selection of benefits for con-
sumption, it may be that those who have the narrowest self-interest at 
heart, who are at the fringe, or whose "dark urges" are most fanatic 
99. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 23, at 96-102. 
100. Or at least, this was Arendt's view. She considered one danger of the public/private 
distinction to lie in the possibility that checks on public power and protection of private property 
could, in a period of economic expansion, produce unchecked private power in the hands of those 
who had not been given the opportunity "of being republicans and of acting as citizens." See H. 
ARENDT, supra note 5, at 256 (emphasis in original). 
101. Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 355 (1987). 
102. Id. at 352. For Manin, it is the opportunity to participate in this interactive process, 
rather than the majoritarian outcome, that gives political decisions their legitimacy. As long as 
losers have had an opportunity to participate and attempt to convince others, they are bound to 
accept the legitimacy of the result. 
103. Manin suggests that the vote tabulates wills at the "end" of the process, id. at 359, but 
there is no reason to believe that deliberation and preference shifting cannot continue even after a 
particular vote on an issue. 
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are the persons for whom voting is the currency of choice. Indeed, if 
those outside the mainstream stand the most to gain by their individ-
ual votes, there is reason to believe that they will be overrepresented in 
the final tally. For these individuals, the capacity to free ride poses 
less of a disincentive to vote for two reasons. First, the group's low 
numbers mean that the marginal utility of each member's vote is sub-
stantially higher than that of a member of the majority. Second, fanat-
icism suggests that these individuals' preferences are intense, so that 
the personal costs of voting are more readily outweighed by personal 
benefits of expressing their positions. For instance, there is evidence 
that, despite professionals' conclusions that fluoridation returns sub-
stantial net benefits, and is generally approved without altercation in 
city councils, referendum proposals for fluoridation have failed sur-
prisingly often. In Massachusetts, for example, the pass rate of fluori-
dation referenda has been only about fifty percent.104 The dra-
matically greater proportion of defeats in referenda is attributed to 
successful intervention by "fringe organizations which, over the years, 
have linked fluoridated water to such diverse phenomena as cancer, 
communism and AIDS."105 In short, we have here an application of 
the moral monster problem that poses difficulty for utilitarian schemes 
generally: how to exclude from a calculus the preferences of the 
wildly irrational. 
The consumption benefits explanation of voting, therefore, does 
not unequivocally support an expanded role for political participation. 
Instead, it suggests that if numerous voters are not motivated by the 
deliberative elements of participation, plebiscites may be less likely 
than representational procedures to produce socially optimal results. 
This would not be the case, however, if the positive, educative or coor-
dinating aspects of consumption voting could be preserved while those 
aspects that appealed to self-interest, particularly the self-interest of 
"moral monsters," could be neutralized. I wish to suggest that, at 
least in some contexts, participatory decisionmaking lends itself to just 
this mix with respect to decisions made at the local level. The context 
in which participatory processes seem most promising are those in 
which both personal and social welfare could be increased by coordi-
nation, but in which transactional obstacles frustrate any cooperative 
solution. In these situations, captured by the logic of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, 1°6 acting cooperatively oftentimes leaves one in a position 
104. See Despite Benefits, Fluoridation Hasn't Yet Swept the Nation, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1986, 
at 33, col. 1. I am grateful to Richard Bonnie for this example. 
105. Id. 
106. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a classic game theory paradigm involving two suspects under 
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worse than would be realized by acting selfishly, unless one can be sure 
that others will also cooperate. The inability to ensure cooperative 
action by others drives each player to a noncooperative strategy. 107 
The problem, then, is to overcome the transactional obstacles to coop-
eration. If those who recognize that cooperation would advance both 
self and social interests could be assured either that sufficient others 
would act similarly, or, at least, that they would not be disadvantaged 
by cooperating (would not be "suckers"), then they might more read-
ily pursue cooperation. Given that recognition of this solution is likely 
to be a product of deliberation, conversation, and contemplation, those 
who actually vote may simultaneously generate superior decisions. In 
short, there may be reason to believe that those who do opt for partici-
pation will choose to exercise that option cooperatively. 
Assume, for instance, a neighborhood comprised of individuals liv-
ing in single-family homes on two-acre lots. Due to appreciating land 
values, each individual would benefit by erecting a large apartment 
house on his or her property, as long as few other neighbors also sub-
divide. If all subdivide, housing demand will still exceed supply, 
although competition will decrease rents below what they otherwise 
would have been. Additionally, the effect of any subdivision will be to 
decrease land values for those neighbors who do not subdivide, as spa-
cious lots become less valuable when situated next to apartment com-
plexes. In this situation, each neighbor is induced to subdivide 
regardless of the action of neighbors. If one's neighbors fail to subdi-
vide, one is driven to subdivide and earn substantial rental income. If 
one's neighbors do subdivide, one is also driven to subdivide and earn 
some rents as opposed to sitting idly by while land values for spacious 
lots in this now crowded neighborhood decline. Further, the neigh-
borhood would maximize its total value if no one subdivided. Never-
theless (ignoring effects outside the neighborhood 108), because each of 
interrogation. If both confess, both will be punished; but if one confesses, he will go free while 
his confederate will be punished relatively severely. If neither confesses, the police will have 
sufficient evidence only to convict both on a lesser charge. Thus the Prisoner's Dilemma: self· 
interest urges him to confess in hope of going free, but if his confederate acts in a similarly self· 
interested way, then both will be worse off than if neither had talked. See A. RAPOPORT, 
FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES 173-79 (1961). 
107. See M. TAYLOR, supra note 67, at 13-18. 
108. External effects, especially in cases such as I have posited, may be substantial and ad· 
verse from the perspective of the larger society. In the above case, internally motivated exclu-
sionary zoning may adversely affect those unable to obtain housing or other benefits of living in a 
certain community. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). Thus, some actions, i.e., those that 
impose substantial external burdens, are properly beyond the scope of local competence gener-
ally. Municipal officials would be no more able to enact legislation imposing such burdens than 
voters in a participatory process would be. For the moment, therefore, I am assuming that the 
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the neighbors will realize that it makes sense for him or her to subdi-
vide regardless of what the others do, all (assuming self-interest) will 
subdivide and thereby produce a socially suboptimal result. 
How could the neighbors, if they recognized that self-interest re-
quired mutual avoidance of subdividing, accomplish that objective in 
the face of the contrary strategies that narrow self-interest compels? If 
the number of neighbors were sufficiently small, they might congregate 
and discuss the issue and recognize as a collective whole that not sub-
dividing served their joint and several interests. They might then 
agree to some enforcement mechanism to enjoin any subsequent subdi-
visions. But the chances of such a collective result are small. 109 Not 
only do neighbors face substantial barriers to communication, but 
should they communicate, each faces incentives not to reveal his or 
her true preferences for not subdividing in order to obtain side pay-
ments from those neighbors who want actively to resist subdivision. 
Failing communicative opportunities for coordination, the neigh-
bors might agree that some superstructure, government, is required to 
bind them to their actual preferences and avoid cheating. Representa-
tive government might reduce transaction costs of communication suf-
ficiently below those of a joint meeting by all concerned to permit 
passage of a municipal ordinance banning subdivision. Indeed, gov-
ernment is generally viewed as an effective mechanism for resolving 
Prisoner's Dilemmas such as the one I have posed, not only by provid-
ing a forum for communication, but also by raising the cost (lowering 
the payoff) of self-interested noncooperation. 110 
But while sufficient, it is not clear that representative intervention 
is necessary to resolve the Dilemma. Instead, participatory processes 
other than mass meetings may be equally effective, even though par-
ticipants are motivated solely by the self-interest-based consumption 
benefits of participation. Indeed, localities may be particularly suscep-
tible to certain coordination solutions to a Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Where those initially caught in the Dilemma interact frequently with 
others who share their position and where the expectation on all sides 
is that the relationship is durable, extralegal incentives for cooperation 
are likely to arise. Incentives for cooperation may be as basic as the 
adverse external effects of the example are sufficiently small to keep the activity properly within 
the scope of municipal affairs. 
109. See, e.g., c. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES AND MATERIALS 35-36 (1984) 
("Homeowner Bickering Ends $100,000 Offer for Houses"). This is not to say that such a collec-
tive result cannot be achieved. See Homeowners Unite in Selling to Developers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
16, 1985, at 1, col. 3. 
llO. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 133 (1984); M. TAYLOR, supra 
note 67, at 21-24. 
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reputational value of not being considered a bad neighbor.1 11 They 
may also, however, be more complicated: for example, a self-inter-
ested actor must consider the ability of neighbors, with whom subse-
quent interactions are expected, to defect on those occasions if the 
actor defects from the cooperative solution on this occasion. Thus, 
each actor has an incentive to cooperate with his or her neighbors, at 
least until such time as the value of future interactions is sufficiently 
discounted that current defections are worthwhile.112 This adverse re-
sult is likely to arise, for instance, if the actor anticipates moving out 
of the jurisdiction shortly after a defecting play. 
This analysis suggests that the capacity for cooperation would be 
enhanced by increased reliance on the plebiscite for public decision-
making. Unless trades are simultaneous, the ability to monitor a trad-
ing partner - and thus to trust partners to keep their end of the 
bargain - depends on the presence of opportunities for punishing 
chiselers. The occasional plebiscite affords no such ability and thus 
generates little concern for repercussions from the remainder of the 
community should a particular segment pursue self-interest on such a 
singular occasion. Where opportunities for retaliation exist, however, 
long-term self-interest mandates coordination with others, even at the 
expense of a short-term personal gain.113 While those who know that 
they will leave the community before the next play may have little 
incentive to follow the cooperative path, the number of such individu-
als at any given time is likely to be small where plebiscites are fre-
quent. Thus, at least in those situations that involve visible displays of 
defecting conduct - e.g., school closings, capital improvements that 
favor one segment of the community - increasing the frequency of 
plebiscites (opportunities for retaliation) is likely to increase the com-
munity's capacity for coordination and compromise. 
One may object that reputational concerns and other constraints 
on defection that rely on fear of retaliation will have little impact 
111. See Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors i11 Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 671-85 (1986). Professor Ellickson's article is part of his larger 
theory that society evolves to a series of wealth-maximizing norms. See, e.g., Ellickson, A Cri· 
tique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987), I 
believe that my argument here is consistent with that theory, though it is not necessary to accept 
Ellickson's views concerning norms generally in order to accept the argument here. 
112. See M. TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION 8-9 (1976). Thus, if in my example 
subdividers will move out of the neighborhood and simply become landlords, the cooperative 
solution is less likely. It is for this reason that one could not expect the participatory process to 
form an effective barrier to racial "block busting," even though cooperation (not defecting by 
leaving a neighborhood as it becomes integrated) would maximize the neighborhood's value. 
113. See M. TAYLOR, supra note 67, at 65-66; R. AXELROD, supra note 110, at 10-11; Rapo-
port, Prisoner's Dilemma - Reco//ectio11s and Observations, in GAME THEORY AS A THEORY OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27-28 (A. Rapoport ed. 1974). 
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where residents register their preferences in privacy, i.e., the voting 
booth. In this situation, one cannot know whether neighbors decided 
to cooperate or defect, and this ignorance relaxes an important check 
on incentives to cooperate. Legislators, on the other hand, may regis-
ter their preferences through roll call votes and are thereby dissuaded 
from defection. While this argument does accurately reflect a particu-
lar advantage of public expressions of loyalty, it implicitly makes two 
major assumptions, neither of which holds in all cases. 114 First, this 
objection assumes that no visible consequences of private voting reveal 
how a vote was cast; and second, it assumes that private voting pro-
vides no offsetting benefits. 
The first assumption may be tested by the Road Repair problem 
originated by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.1 15 They posit an 
area in which one hundred farmers live on various roads, the primary 
purpose of which is to access a main highway. The decision to repair 
any of the area's roads is made by majority vote, but once a decision to 
repair is approved, all one hundred residents must contribute to the 
cost. The authors suggest that a "Kantian" solution would lead road 
repair to be undertaken only when a road falls to a state of disrepair 
below the median preference for road maintenance. Nevertheless, 
"maximizers" would be able to attain supramedian levels of road re-
pair by voting against all proposals to repair roads other than their 
own and by voting to repair their own roads at each opportunity. Any 
maximizer would gain the full benefit of a repaired road, but contrib-
ute only about one one-hundredth of its cost. Buchanan and Tullock 
suggest that maximizers would tend to form coalitions that would en-
able those involved to obtain a superior level of road repair while shift-
ing the costs of the improvements to nonmembers and Kantians. A 
Kantian, on the other hand, "would never have his own road repaired, 
but he would have to pay taxes for the support of other local 
roads." 116 The result would be a suboptimal arrangement in which 
substantial resources were invested in attempting to form coalitions 
and strike bargains that expropriated the wealth of neighbors. 
Even maximizers, however, may behave very differently in the 
Road Repair scenario. Unless the one hundred farmers have little 
contact with one another, so that their reputations within the commu-
nity are nonexistent or meaningless, the visibility of their selfish con-
duct constrains the behavior that Buchanan and Tullock predict. It 
114. Of course, if one felt that private voting was a major obstacle to achieving electoral 
results consistent with public interest, one could advocate that plebiscitary votes be cast publicly. 
115. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 135-45 (1962). 
116. Id. at 140. 
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should be readily apparent who is voting for which road repairs. In-
deed, the very visibility of an individual's vote makes possible the 
monitoring of behavior without which the coalitions necessary to max-
imizing behavior could not be formed. That same visibility, however, 
allows those who obtain frequent road repairs to be classified as "bad 
neighbors." It may be that particular farmers within the community 
are immune to the implications of such a label. Nevertheless, the case 
posited by Buchanan and Tullock, a small community of individuals 
involved in a similar enterprise, seems particularly susceptible to 
reputational concerns. It is in just such a situation that one would 
expect to see repeated contacts with neighbors and occasional oppor-
tunities for mutual assistance, the very elements that create motives to 
cooperate rather than expropriate.117 It is true, as Buchanan and Tul-
lock recognize, that short-term gains materialize from behaving as a 
maximizer. What they consider less, however, is the possibility of 
long-term gains from cooperation that, even when discounted, deter 
self-interested farmers from engaging in supraoptimal road repair. 
Again, this realization occurs not because the maximizing farmers 
suddenly become Kantians, but because their own self-interest man-
dates a course of action that preserves their reputation among 
neighbors. 118 
Even if reputational concerns generate cooperation, their effects 
may be reduced as the size of the locality increases. The probability of 
repeated dealings, or iterations, with one's neighbors declines as popu-
lation size increases. Thus, Douglas Hofstadter has noted (and I un-
happily confirm) that drivers in the Boston area assiduously avoid 
efforts at cooperation. Once a defecting driver has engaged in oppor-
tunistic behavior and cut off or passed by less aggressive (more risk 
averse, law-abiding, or rational) drivers, opportunity for future inter-
actions, and thus for retaliation, is small.119 
Even in the absence of opportunities for retaliation, however, ple-
biscitary processes may produce a solution to the coordination prob-
117. R. AxELROD, supra note 110. 
118. Where the consequences of voting are invisible, voting in private contains various ad· 
vantages, not the least of which is the disincentive it provides to public misstatement of one's 
position in order to receive payoffs for a particular vote. As noted above, collective action may 
be frustrated by individuals who understate their preferences for certain services in the hope that 
they will be able either to free ride off others or receive side payments to induce a particular 
course of action. Where votes are publicly expressed, these side payments are likely because the 
payor can monitor the behavior of the payee. Private voting, however, reduces the capacity for 
monitoring, and thus reduces incentives to hold out or understate preferences in the hope of 
receiving a side payment. As long as unanimity is not required, moreover, some defections from 
socially optimal behavior can be tolerated. 
119. D. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE EssENCE OF MIND 
AND PATTERN 732-33 (1985). 
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lem. The reason is a subtle distinction between the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game and the majoritarian nature of the plebiscite. One of 
the salient features of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that defection rather 
than cooperation is a dominant strategy; each player is better off de-
fecting, regardless of whether other players defect or cooperate. 120 
Cooperation is penalized unless others uniformly cooperate, since the 
cooperator invests resources that cannot be recouped if others defect. 
Thus, the preference of each player is that all others save himself coop-
erate.121 In my previous subdivision example, for instance, one who 
cooperates (does not subdivide) comes out worse if any other home-
owner does subdivide. Thus all homeowners are driven to the subop-
timal strategy of subdividing.122 
What if, however, we could assure each homeowner that coopera-
tion will not be penalized because individuals who prefer to cooperate 
will not be bound unless all cooperate. Since each individual would 
prefer a situation in which all cooperate to one in which none cooper-
ates, creating expectations about what others will do is likely to gener-
ate universal cooperation. No longer are we in a situation in which 
defection is dominant, Le., in which it is best to defect regardless of 
what others do. 123 Instead, those who prefer cooperation would be 
willing to express that preference without fear that defection by others 
could leave them worse off. A majoritarian voting system produces 
just that result. A cooperative vote in a plebiscite matters only if suffi-
cient (a majority of) others also vote for the cooperative option. If 
others vote to subdivide (defect), they gain no advantage over the 
voter who wishes to cooperate, because the latter is not bound if the 
majority decision is against his preference. Each voter is able to act 
with impunity as if he or she had a preference for the cooperative solu-
120. See Campbell, Background for the Uninitiated, in PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND 
COOPERATION 3, 16-18 (R. Campbell & L. Sowden eds. 1985); M. TAYLOR, supra note 67' at 13-
18. 
121. See Sen,lsolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. EcoN. 112 (1967). 
122. The result here is more invidious than simple free riding. Where free riding is possible, 
those who cooperate may not be able·to achieve their aims, but they also do not necessarily lose 
anything other than the benefits that would have materialized had the venture succeeded. As-
sume, for instance, that a municipality of 12,000 persons seeks to construct an outdoor pedes-
trian mall at a cost of $10,000 and pay for it through citizen donations of $1 rather than through 
taxes or fees. If all citizens would receive $2 of benefit from the mall, each would receive a net 
benefit from contributing. The alternative of noncontribution by all, moreover, would be inferior 
to the alternative of contribution by all. Nevertheless, each citizen would prefer that only others 
contribute, since personal gains would thereby be maximized, so that self-interested citizens 
would fail to contribute and insufficient subscriptions would result. If those (altruists, "suckers") 
who contribute receive refunds of their contributions should the venture fail, however, they are 
no worse off than they were previously. In the subdivision situation, however, investment of 
resources in cooperation leads to net losses should others defect. 
123. Sen, supra note 121, at 114. 
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tion. Since the compelling reasons to defect no longer exist, the domi-
nant strategy of defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma is replaced by 
something like an Assurance Game, in which each player prefers to 
follow a certain strategy because she is assured that every other player 
will follow the same strategy.124 That assurance seems likely where 
there is no downside risk to expressing a preference for cooperation. If 
the Prisoner's Dilemma involved only two players, the possibility of 
defection by one of them would quickly cause degeneration of the co-
operative solution. But where the Dilemma involves numerous play-
ers (an n-person game), and each is bound to cooperate only if a 
majority agree, it will not matter that a few residents have incentives 
to vote for defection. As long as the majority retains an interest in the 
cooperative solution, cooperation should dominate. 125 Indeed, as long 
as a majority of voters act as if they prefer cooperation, cooperative 
solutions will result.126 
Here lies the final response to Buchanan and Tullock's admonition 
that maximizing behavior is likely to materialize. They recognize that 
a particular farmer who takes the attitude, "If no one else acts, I shall 
not act," will not initiate the cycle that ultimately leads to a "maxi-
mizing equilibrium" below the social optimum. 127 Nevertheless, they 
understate the force of such an attitude. According to Buchanan and 
Tullock, this attitude would preclude maximizing behavior only if all 
members of the group assume the attitude and also believe that all 
other members will share it. Yet these strong criteria, which the au-
thors properly conclude are highly improbable, seem unnecessary 
where farmers are voting whether to repair a specific road. If majority 
vote decides the issue, then presumably maximizing conduct, while 
not precluded, could be rejected by a majority. Thus, it would be suffi-
cient to achieve optimal social results if a majority of farmers took the 
attitude, "If a majority does not act, I shall not act."128 
Is it possible that such an attitude would evolve within a majority? 
The answer, of course, is unclear. It becomes more probable as the 
124. See Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 341, 349-51 
(1985); Sen, supra note 121. I say "something like" an Assurance Game because in a pure Assur-
ance Game all players in fact have a preference for cooperation. In voting there may be numer-
ous players who do not prefer cooperation. Nevertheless, since majority rules, those who express 
a preference for cooperation lose nothing if insufficient others cooperate. Should sufficient others 
cooperate, even those with a preference for defection are bound by the majority decision. 
125. Cf. Hardin, Individual Sanctions, Collective Benefits, in PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY 
AND COOPERATION 339, 344 (R. Campbell & L. Sowden eds. 1985). 
126. See Sen, Choice, Orderings and Morality, in PRACTICAL REASON 54, 60 (S. Komer ed. 
1974). 
127. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 115, at 141. 
128. Id. at 142-43. 
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strong assumption of self-interest is relaxed to permit voters to con-
sider their neighbors' as well their own welfare. The same effect may 
be accomplished, however, by retaining an assumption of self-interest 
but incorporating a high payoff for reputation as a cooperator. In 
either situation, the likelihood that the necessary conventions will 
evolve seems most probable within the confines of a locality. Thus, 
Jane Mansbridge concludes that the small size of jurisdictions able to 
benefit from direct democracy "and the potential for greater empathy 
among their citizens also make them more likely to approach a genu-
ine common interest."129 Should this empathy materialize, raw major-
itarianism becomes less of an evil than the criticis~ of plebiscites 
suggests. The empathetic solution, however, requires relaxation of the 
self-interested view of voters. The possibility of Assurance Game re-
sults, on the other hand, suggests that even self-interested voters could 
reject the "maximizing" solution because they would (self-inter-
estedly) prefer that no one maximizes and could vote that preference 
without fear of adverse consequences should they be joined by only a 
minority of their peers. 
D. The Plebiscite, Logrolling, and Compromise 
The continuity of the community suggests a response to another 
alleged institutional defect of the plebiscite. One of the perceived cor-
ollaries to the deliberative capacity of legislatures is their tendency to 
achieve compromise. This result may be effected in either of two 
forms. Logrolling permits explicit vote trading so that individuals 
who are unconcerned about particular issues may exchange votes with 
others in return for support on matters of greater personal importance. 
Public choice models of government suggest that vote trading may 
generate mutual advantages for all traders insofar as it permits parties 
to exchange one set of preferences for another. 130 Indeed, Frank 
Michelman has attempted to explain, in public choice terms, a series 
of Supreme Court cases restricting referenda by arguing that the in-
ability of the electorate to "dicker ... for support now in exchange for 
your support on something else later" undermines the "legitimacy" of 
plebiscites. 131 
Those who consider logrolling a value-creating mechanism, how-
ever, assume that the legislature is the sole forum where trading can 
129. Mansbridge, Living With Conflict: Representation in the Theory of Adversary Democ-
racy, 91 ETHICS 466, 475 (1981). 
130. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 115, at 122-23. 
131. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial 
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 182 (1977-1978). 
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effectively occur. 132 The legislature alone has the capacity to indulge 
the "transactional assurance - the assurance from log-rolling - of 
broadly distributed long-run net benefits from public action."133 On 
this view, legislators, limited in number and scheduled to convene at 
specific times and places, not only overcome the obstacles to mass 
meetings, but also have incentives to compromise. Continuation in 
office and advancement to higher office depend largely on an ability to 
further the interests of constituents. Action that imperfectly coincides 
with constituents' preferences is more likely to appeal to voters than 
inaction. Thus, if compromise can effect more action, legislators are 
likely to find compromise useful. Further, trading can occur only if 
the same potential traders are involved in multiple transactions, either 
sequentially or simultaneously. Unless there exists substantial ability 
to monitor a trading partner's subsequent behavior and punish chisel-
ers, one would anticipate that only simultaneous trades would occur. 
Monitoring and retaliation may be possible in a legislature, where de-
fections can be observed and redressed. Voters who cast votes on only 
a single issue, such as in a plebiscite, however, cannot make binding 
promises about votes in subsequent issues on which they might be will-
ing to trade, because those subsequent issues cannot be assured to ma-
terialize.134 Even those explicit bargains that could occur in a 
plebiscitary forum would be deterred by the inability to police any 
promisor's performance in the privacy of the voting booth. 
I believe that both the premise and conclusion of this argument for 
the superiority of legislative compromise is seriously flawed. The 
premise of logrolling states that the practice increases value because it 
gives those with the highest intensity of preference control over an 
electoral outcome. 135 Logrolling creates incentives for representatives 
to act even with respect to matters in which they have very little inter-
est. If votes are taken on such issues at a time when the representative 
is already present to vote on a matter of greater personal interest, the 
cost of casting a vote on the former issue is quite low. Failure to cast 
any vote may expose the representative to charges of absenteeism or 
shirking. In such a situation, logrolling may indeed enhance value by 
directing those who would vote in any event to do so in a socially 
optimal direction. Plebiscitary voting, however, appears to be a simi-
larly effective mechanism for reflecting relative intensity of preference. 
132. See, J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 115, at 132-35. 
133. Michelman, supra note 131, at 182. 
134. But see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 115, at 120-21 (suggesting that log-
rolling can occur when decisions are spread over time). 
135. Id. at 132-33. 
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The consumption benefits explanation of voting requires that those 
who have little interest in the outcome will simply not vote at all. 
Even where referenda are voted simultaneously with other issues, vot-
ers already in the booth may ignore plebiscitary propositions, since 
they cannot trade for someone else's vote on a matter of greater per-
sonal importance.136 If individuals with little interest in the outcome 
of a ballot proposition are unlikely to vote on an issue, then the fear 
that issues will be decided by those without strong preferences seems 
unjustified. 
Apart from the practical need for logrolling, the argument that 
plebiscites lack devices for compromise seems fundamentally flawed. 
The argument presumes compromise to be a good, a political quality 
to be fostered. This contention overstates the vitality of compromise. 
Compromise is useful insofar as it allows the formation of majorities 
over discrete issues and thereby forestalls paralysis by those who wish 
only particular courses of action. In Hirschman's terms, compromise 
reduces transportation costs, the c;listance anyone has to travel in order 
to accept a position.137 Compromise, however, is unavailable in the 
myriad situations where political choices rest on binary alternatives. 138 
The question in these situations is less one of implementation, a matter 
on which compromise is possible, and more one of whether to pursue a 
course of conduct at all. If these situations are subjected to a plebi-
scite, therefore, the relative inability of the populace to achieve com-
promise is irrelevant. 
Nor is compromise necessarily as difficult to achieve in the plebis-
citary process as Michelman suggests. Individual voters are not pre-
vented from engaging in reflective processes prior to voting. 
Proponents of an initiative or referendum measure surely understand 
136. My evidence on dropoff rates is largely anecdotal, and I am unsure what to conclude 
from it as a matter of statistical significance. In 1986, Massachusetts voters had opportunities to 
elect a governor and to vote on six statewide questions. Approximately 1.7 million votes were 
cast for governor. Between 92% and 98% of that total were cast for the questions. Boston 
Globe, Nov. 6, 1986, at 23, col. 2. In 1984, voting on local questions ranged from 41 % to 99.5% 
of the votes cast for President by residents of those localities. The median appears to have been 
about 85%. Boston Globe, Nov. 8, 1984, at 44, col. 4. Magleby reports somewhat higher drop-
off rates for Californians in the 1976 general election. He indicates that of those who voted for 
president in that year, between 80% and 95% voted for various statewide propositions. See D. 
MAGLEBY, supra note 28, at 91. 
137. A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 57, at 66-67. 
138. Such a zero-sum game characterizes numerous local plebiscites. Questions about fluori-
dation of local water supplies, funding construction of a local stadium, granting licenses to veter-
ans' organizations, and permitting pari-mutuel betting can only be resolved by yes-no voting. On 
strategies to resolve binary choice, zero-sum games, see R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND 
DECISIONS 90-91 (1957). Where money issues are at stake, compromise may be an effective 
mechanism for achieving optimal results. But, for other reasons, these issues are not easily sus-
ceptible to plebiscitary processes. See text at notes 190-91 infra. 
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the yes-no nature of the choice with which they will confront voters. 
The effect of that limited choice is necessarily mollifying. If the mea-
sure is to attain sufficient support, it may have to take a form more 
moderate than the one favored by its most zealous advocates. In order 
to achieve some semblance of victory, they must reduce the transpor-
tation costs of less radical voters. Initial legislative proposals that are 
subject to subsequent debate and modification in the legislative forum 
may, on the other hand, initially be stated in extreme form precisely 
because there are subsequent opportunities for compromise and mod-
eration. Advocates may hope to attain the closest approximation of 
their ideal by beginning with more radical proposals and giving up 
only what is necessary for passage. Thus, the very possibility of incre-
mental changes through compromise induces more radical proposals 
at the start. The availability of compromise, in short, creates the need 
for it. One cannot, therefore, assume that propositions submitted to 
binary choices without opportunities for subsequent compromise are 
necessarily of less general appeal than those ultimately passed by legis-
lative processes. 
If we relax the assumption of this section that legislators always 
act in a manner that reflects their conception of public interest, the 
motivation that makes legislative compromises easy also renders their 
substance suspect. The repeat play of legislators is conducive to the 
formation of coalitions that may serve the members' interests rather 
than those of the represented. Self-interested legislators may reach in-
appropriate compromises or reject appropriate ones because contrary 
decisions conflict with selfish opportunities for advancement. While 
the logrolling that generates these coalitions may be value-enhancing 
from the perspective of the individual members, there is no reason to 
believe that logrolling also enhances value at the social level. Indeed, 
some state constitutional prohibitions on legislative action may best be 
understood as reactions to concerns that coalitions could be easily 
formed in a manner that would reduce social welfare. The common 
bar on special legislation, for instance, can be understood as a means 
to prevent representatives of one locality from trading votes with dis-
interested representatives from other localities to obtain support for a 
measure that would benefit the former by an amount less than the 
aggregate of losses to other localities, but substantially greater than the 
loss to any other individual locality.139 
139. Assume, for instance, that passage of special legislation would benefit locality A by 10 
and would cause localities B through Z losses of 1 each, for a total loss of 25. Assume further 
that locality B desires the vote of the representative of A on a matter that would benefit B by 5, 
but will inflict on the rest of the state a total loss of 8. A and B should be willing to trade votes, 
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Outside of coalitions, legislators who hold marginal votes may be 
able to extract substantial prices for their support. They, in effect, 
hold monopoly positions available in hold-out situations generally. 140 
While the net social gain from legislative compromise may still prove 
positive, it may be smaller than the gain that would have been pro-
vided by the less interactive compromises that characterize plebiscites. 
E. Collective Action and Time Horizons 
If we accept the assumptions of a publicly interested body of legis-
lators and a self-interested electorate, however, Michelman initially 
seems correct in one respect - representatives appear to possess a 
greater capacity than the electorate to consider "long-term effects" 
and thus achieve results that approximate the socially optimal. Coor-
dination becomes less compelling as a solution in this situation, as self-
interested voters would presumably either fail to take adverse long-
term social effects into account (if they were certain they would be 
gone from the locality when those effects materialized), or discount 
those effects to reflect uncertainty about being in the municipality 
when the effects materialized. In either case, voters would be likely to 
overvalue a proposal's short-term benefits and undervalue its long-
term costs. A substantial literature suggests that legislators and local 
officials suffer from the same skew in comparing intertemporal costs 
and benefits. 141 Preoccupation of local officials with success at the next 
election generates a bias in favor of projects that promise benefits in 
the short term. Long-term costs are likely to be heavily discounted 
because officials will not be in office to absorb the blame when those 
effects materialize. For current purposes, however, I have assumed 
the existence of publicly interested legislators. Thus, plebiscitary deci-
and thus enhance the probability each measure will pass, even though the measures produce a net 
loss to the state. 
140. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of tlze Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 pro-
vides one possible example of this phenomenon. The House bill that became the Act contained 
numerous provisions that appear to assist a small number of taxpayers (i.e. one). One interpreta-
tion of these provisions is that they were inserted at the insistence of a particular legislator in 
return for support of the Act as a whole. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 
Stat. 2085, §§ 633(e), 657(a), 1317. 
141. See Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation, 36 Buff. L. 
Rev. 15, 46-47 (1987); Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and tlze Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1060-64 (1983). These incentives may also skew decisionmaking by cor-
porate managers who wish to demonstrate profits each quarter. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A 
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 119 (1963); Henderson, Product Liability and tlze Passage 
of Time: Tlze Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 780-82 (1983); 
Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 
784-85 (1985); Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV. 
July-Aug. 1980, at 67. 
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sions with substantial intertemporal effects can be endorsed only if 
voters, like (fictional) publicly interested legislators, consider long-
term costs. 
Curiously, the plebiscite's expected favoritism of short-term bene-
fits at the expense of long-term costs arises with less than expected 
frequency. The primary evidence of this phenomenon emerges from 
bond elections. If voters act from narrow conceptions of self-interest, 
one would expect a high acceptance rate for bond referenda in which 
voters decide whether or not to fund municipal improvements with 
long-term debt. These referenda systematically favor the short-term, 
as the improvements are expected to materialize within a few years 
after approval, while payment is spread out over the useful life of the 
funded project. Short-term benefits, therefore, are likely to exceed 
short-term costs. It is future generations of residents who bear the 
downside risk of these investments, as risks of failure or of a lack of 
need for the project are more likely to materialize with the passage of 
time. Indeed, concern for favoritism of the short-term may well un-
derlie the requirements in numerous jurisdictions that long-term mu-
nicipal debt be approved by a supermajority of the electorate.142 
Similarly, commentators have suggested that local officials will over-
invest municipal resources in debt issues because they will receive the 
credit for capital improvements, but will likely no longer be in office 
should the consequent risks of liability or higher interest rates 
materialize.143 
Nevertheless, bond referenda are not systematically approved by 
the public. Instead, they are defeated with substantial regularity. Var-
ious explanations may exist for this disapproval. It may be that short-
term gains are too minuscule even to outweigh short-term costs. Resi-
dents may expect to remain in the municipality for a substantial period 
of time, and thus believe that they will ultimately bear the full costs of 
the project. 144 If residents with expected longevity constitute a sub-
stantial share of the electorate, their self-interested decisions may gen-
erate results that reflect total costs (both short- and long-term) as well 
as total benefits. Alternatively, it may be that those who stand to lose 
from passage of the proposal tum out to vote in greater percentages 
than those who stand to gain. The former may constitute a more or-
142. See, e.g., Gordon v.'Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); WASH. CONST. art. VIII,§ 6. 
143. See A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS, 162 (1978); Gillette, supra note 141, at 1063. 
144. Obviously, this effect will vary with the period for which the debt is expected to be 
outstanding. Capital improvements that are financed over a three-year period, for instance, may 
receive more public scrutiny than projects to be financed over a forty-year period, even though 
the annual per capita cost of the two projects is identical. 
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ganized subgroup of the community and may have more at stake in 
the result than the latter, so that a significant disparity exists in the 
motivation to vote. 
It may also be the case, however, that voters, or a sufficient seg-
ment of them, consider the long-term effects of their decisions on the 
community at large. In short, rational conduct by voters may cross 
temporal boundaries; people, acting rationally, may fail to discount 
future adverse effects to present value. 145 While one need not abandon 
the assumption of self-interest to achieve this result, it does require 
some expansion of the term. It suggests that individual self-interest is 
entwined with the long-term interests of one's community. Individu-
als, on this view, develop long time horizons in which they consider 
the effects of current action. If voters systematically act in this way, 
there seems little reason to treat their decisions with greater distrust 
than those that are legislatively approved. Perhaps one test of this 
hypothesis would be to examine the rates of passage of bond elections 
for debt with various terms. If voters act with concern for future resi-
dents, one would expect that relatively short-term debt would pass at 
about the same rate as longer term debt. Otherwise, one would expect 
that longer term debt would be approved at a higher rate, since part of 
the cost will be borne only by future residents. There could be alterna-
tive explanations for any such differential, e.g., improper discount 
rates applied by current residents. Nevertheless, analysis of relative 
rates of passage might provide some information about claims that 
voters internalize costs and benefits over a time period shorter than 
that considered by represep.tatives. 
Even if voters are inattentive to long-term costs, their decisions 
may be no more skewed than those of representatives. To explore this 
possibility, we must relax the assumption of public interest among the 
latter group. As I have indicated above, a substantial literature raises 
the spectre of a legislature too attentive to the next election to consider 
long-term costs of projects. Implicit in this view is a conception of an 
electorate with a short time horizon; otherwise the electorate would 
decline to reelect representatives who ignored long-term costs. If this 
is the case, plebiscitary decisions still may be no worse than representa-
tive decisions from the perspective of intertemporal costs and benefits. 
While this comparison provides scant praise for the plebiscite, it does 
challenge Michelman's initial conclusion about the comparative supe-
riority of legislative judgments. Any inference drawn from this self-
interest model of legislatures, however, requires a more thorough ex-
145. See D. PARAT, supra note 70, at 356-57, 480-86. 
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amination of the capacity of interest groups to capture both legisla-
tures and the electorate, an issue to which I now turn.146 
III. INTEREST GROUPS AND MINORITY CAPTURE OF PLEBISCITES 
Ballot propositions do not appear magically. They arise because a 
particular group has been willing to dedicate the time and effort neces-
sary to place the issue before the electorate. As most jurisdictions re-
quire petitions to bear the signatures of a substantial number of voters 
before a proposition may be placed on the ballot, the costs of placing 
plebiscitary proposals on the ballot may be significant. 147 The public 
goods nature of legislation, however, suggests that even those who 
would benefit from particular legislation would be unwilling to initiate 
the plebiscitary process, as they would obtain the same benefits should 
they do nothing and others - who would similarly gain - fill the 
void. Thus, one would predict that plebiscites will be initiated by 
those with idiosyncratic interests in securing the legislation. That 
these individual interests are so substantial as to make the costs of the 
plebiscite worthwhile, however, may indicate that the underlying legis-
lation deviates substantially from what would serve the public interest. 
In short, one group may be attempting to expropriate wealth from 
nongroup members, although the former's use of such wealth will not 
return greater social benefits. Furthermore, it seems likely that these 
idiosyncratic interests will be overrepresented among actual voters. If 
the costs of mounting the plebiscitary campaign are worth undertak-
ing, net expected benefits are unlikely to be exceeded by the additional 
costs associated with voting for the proposal. Conversely, those who • 
would be adversely affected by passage of the proposition may not suf-
fer sufficient individual losses to make voting worthwhile. These ten-
dencies are exacerbated by the willingness of proponents of the 
measure to convince potential voters - through advertising and other 
forms of persuasion - that passage is in their (the voters') best inter-
ests, while those less interested in the outcome have less reason to con-
vince potential voters to do otherwise. For instance, if a municipal 
146. I am reluctant to draw support for the propositions in this section from studies of the 
efficiency of direct democracy, particularly those predicated on elections in other countries. It is 
somewhat comforting, however, to have discovered a study by Eli Noam, based on referendum 
voting in Swiss cantons, that suggests few (5%) inefficient results, defined as defeat of proposi-
tions notwithstanding that majority gains from passage would have exceeded minority loss. See 
Noam, The Efficiency of Direct Democracy, 88 J. POL. ECON. 803 (1980). While this finding may 
provide precious little support for my own theory, a contrary finding would have presented a 
formidable obstacle. 
147. These costs may be incurred either through direct collection of signatures by advocates 
of a proposition or through monetary payments to professional agencies that collect signatures 
for a fee. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 28, at 61-65. 
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expenditure will generate one million dollars in revenue to a private 
developer, but will raise any one resident's tax rates only minutely, the 
developer has substantial motivation to secure passage of the authoriz-
ing legislation, while no resident would obtain net financial gains from 
opposing it. Thus, the same rationale that suggests majorities will not 
vote also suggests that minorities will be able to capture the political 
process and enact legislation that satisfies their narrow interests. 
While the prospect of deliberative voting may address the need to co-
ordinate self-interested actors, diffusion of cooperators may produce 
insufficient incentives to address the problem of expropriation. This, 
in brief, is the concern about interest group capture of the plebiscitary 
process.148 
Analyzed in a vacuum, there appears to be substantial reason to 
fear minority capture of the plebiscite. Given the proclivity of voters 
to avoid special interest elections (e.g., bond elections), one would im-
agine that even those who otherwise feel duty-bound to vote are less 
motivated to tum out in these plebiscites.149 Thus, referenda and initi-
ative elections may be particularly susceptible to capture by interest 
groups. Indeed, the possibility that special interests could use propa-
ganda to convince those predisposed to vote but less concerned about 
the underlying position for which they were voting has generated sub-
stantial calls for limits on financing plebiscites.150 
Missing from this account, however, is an understanding that in-
terest group capture of the plebiscite does not occur in a vacuum. The 
normative force of the objection must face three issues: the ability of 
plebiscites to further public interest; the relative capacity of interest 
groups to influence legislators as opposed to the electorate; and the 
capacity of other institutions (the judiciary in particular) to neutralize 
the influence of interest groups. If groups that advance plebiscites are 
actually serving public interest, or if legislators are similarly suscepti-
ble to capture by interest groups, or if there exist external constraints 
148. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 28, at 29-30; Bell, supra note 28, at 13-15. 
149. It is somewhat ironic that voters flock to the polls in greater numbers for those elections 
in which their votes are less likely to make a difference, e.g., presidential or other federal elec-
tions. This anomaly is inconsistent with the hypothesis that people vote only to bring about a 
certain electoral result. 
150. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 28, at 145-51; Lowenstein, supra note 30; Mastro, Costlow 
& Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media 
Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315 (1980); Shockley, Direct Democracy, 
Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Con-
fidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377 (1985). See also First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (striking down a Massachusetts statute which prohibited corporate expendi-
tures for the purpose of "influencing or affecting the vote of any question submitted to the voters, 
other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation"). 
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on the capacity of interest groups to secure overrepresentation at the 
polls, then concerns about minority capture may be less meritorious. 
A. Plebiscites in the Public Interest 
It seems doubtful that someone acting in the public interest would 
undertake the costs necessary to mount a successful plebiscitary cam-
paign given traditional understanqings of free riding and collective ac-
tion. Since the public benefits of legislation would accrue without any 
contribution on the part of beneficiaries, as long as others undertook 
to enact the legislation, there is little incentive for any proponent to act 
at all. At best, the costs may be worthwhile to a political entrepreneur 
who hopes to enhance his own career through the success of an organ-
ization with which he is associated, 151 or by serving as a symbol 
around which diffuse, nonorganized individuals can coalesce. For in-
stance, students of collective action have suggested that Richard 
Nixon and Edmund Muskie appealed to the environmental movement 
not so much out of concern for the environment as to enhance their 
support from environmentalists.152 Since the sine qua non of entrepre-
neurship is self-interest, however, any deviation between the interests 
of promoters of a ballot proposition and public interest is likely to be 
resolved in favor of the former. 153 Similarly, there can be little assur-
ance that an entrepreneur whose political goals have been achieved 
will continue to advance the objectives of the group. Retention of of-
fice or advancement to higher office may require or permit attention to 
interests different from those that placed the political entrepreneur in 
office initially.154 If candidates are willing to act in this manner, there 
is little reason to believe that those who head plebiscitary campaigns 
would have different, more publicly interested motives. 
Alternatively, true "grass-roots" movements may reflect that the 
costs of political action, though high, are worth taking, because the 
personal costs of collective inaction are even higher. Where personal 
costs of organizers coincide with social costs of inaction, self interested 
conduct may serve social welfare generally. Here, we might return to 
Hirschman's theory that political action may be born of disappoint-
ment, or, more specifically, of a concern for deterioration in a group of 
151. See N. FROHLICH, J. OPPENHEIMER & 0. YOUNG, supra note 37, at 6-8. 
152. See R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 35-37; Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory 
of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 333-
38 (1985). 
153. See N. FROHLICH, J. OPPENHEIMER & o. YOUNG, supra note 37, at 8-9. 
154. See, e.g., Kau & Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 
22 J.L. & EcoN. 365 (1979) (importance of personal ideology rather than constituents' interests 
in congressional voting behavior). 
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which one is a member. 155 Other things being equal, the rational reac-
tion to such a situation may be exit from the group, or, in the case of 
localities, migration to a more compatible jurisdiction. Other things, 
however, are not always equal; the costs of exit - leaving familiar 
jobs, schools, or neighbors - may be substantial. Reactions of indi-
viduals in such situations may be to "grin and bear it," to deny the 
existence of the problem, 156 or - should the costs of inaction be both 
personally severe and difficult to deny - to take ameliorative action. 
The last option, of course, will confer benefits on noncontributors, and 
thus may be disfavored. In some situations, however, that effect is 
overridden by the personal gains to the actor. 
An example of such a situation may be found in James Krier and 
Edmund Ursin's account of the development of political responses to 
motor vehicle air pollution in California. They suggest that barriers to 
addressing pollution through collective action among citizens were 
overcome by the emergence of crises that made the costs of inaction 
particularly salient. One relatively effective citizens' group with long-
standing participation in the creation of pollution policy was founded 
by 
a Beverly Hills mother [who] had to rush her young child to a hospital as 
a result of an asthma attack brought on by smog conditions. Advised by 
the child's doctor that it would be best for the family to leave Los Ange-
les, the mother " 'decided instead to stay and do something about air 
pollution.' " 157 
While such groups may lack the "energy and resources to organize 
major lobbying efforts,"158 the costs imposed on them by "public 
bads" may be sufficient to induce their participation in the creation of 
public goods, notwithstanding traditional free riding obstacles. 
The citizen groups studied by Krier and Ursin primarily served as 
lobbyists; similar groups, however, may channel their energies into 
lawmaking through plebiscites. Where exit costs are high, voice op-
tions may take various forms in an effort to remedy the cause of dissat-
isfaction. If initial expressions of concern - mere complaints -
evoke insufficient response from those in a position to ameliorate the 
situation, the next level of voice may mandate direct action by the 
disgruntled. In this vein, it is possible to view recent "tax revolt" pleb-
iscites, typically initiated by citizen groups, less as an effort by nar-
155. See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 57. 
156. The reaction of dissonance is explored in A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 57, at 93-96; Ack-
erlof & Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 
(1982). 
157. J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 78, at 272. 
158. Id. 
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rowly self-interested individuals to minimize social services than as an 
attack on uncontrolled governmental expenditures or imbalance 
among sources of revenue. 159 If the objectives of these movements sat-
isfy our conception of public interest, then any attempt to restrict pleb-
iscites must consider the cost of their elimination. 
B. Legislatures and Electorates as Targets of Capture 
Not all grass-roots movements for plebiscites emerge from public 
interest, of course. A desire by one group to expropriate the wealth of 
another may also underlie attempts to alter the status quo. The pro-
posed closing of a neighborhood school, for instance, may impose sub-
stantial costs on parents who would be required to transport their 
children elsewhere and who fear the disintegration of other aspects of 
their neighborhood. While these expected costs may be insufficient to 
overcome the substantial barriers to exit, they may be sufficient to in-
duce organized behavior, including petitioning for a referendum. 160 
Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that groups formed in this 
manner are attempting to vindicate any broader interests than those of 
their own neighborhood. These groups, therefore, do not vary in per-
spective from more traditional interest groups that represent the finan-
cial interests of their membership. Yet even if these groups have the 
resources necessary to gain access to plebiscitary processes, that ave-
nue becomes a source of concern only if the plebiscite is more suscepti-
ble to interest groups than is the legislature. 
Certainly, a rich literature suggests that legislative action is sys-
tematically undertaken at the behest of special interest groups rather 
than in furtherance of the public interest. 161 The explanation for this 
phenomenon lies in an understanding of legislators as rational self-
interested actors rather than pure altruists. As in any relationship be-
tween a principal and a self-regarding agent, there is likely to be some 
divergence of interest between legislators and their constituencies. 
Ideally, any divergence is minimized by a legislator's desire to retain 
electoral support or attain higher office. Outside the realm of the 
159. See Davis, A Brief History of Proposition 2 1 /2, in PROPOSITION 2 1/2: ITS IMPACT ON 
MASSACHUSETTS 3, 4-5 (L. Susskind ed. 1983). 
160. See Moore v. School Comm. of Newton, 375 Mass. 443, 378 N.E.2d 347 (1978). 
161. See, e.g., R. CASS, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND 38 (1981) (legislative votes likely 
to be predicated on relative intensity of expressed interests rather than majority opinion); Macey, 
supra note 10; Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 
(1976); Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 Pua. CHOICE 19 (1973). For 
expressions of faith concerning legislative solicitude for the public interest in at least some legisla-
tive action, see Kalt & Zupan, supra note 49; Verba & Orren, The Meaning of Equality it1 
America, 100 POL. SCI. Q. 369 (1985). 
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ideal, however, there remain situations in which representatives can 
ignore the interests of constituents with relative impunity. 
The first such situation is where free riding will be prevalent in the 
electorate. As noted above, only those most interested in a particular 
piece of legislation - those to whom the costs of expressing prefer-
ences and seeking legislative approval are worth the benefits - will 
actually engage in the lobbying efforts necessary to secure passage. 
Legislators seeking electoral support presumably will be attentive to 
lobbying efforts, as the lobby has evidenced its willingness to advance 
or withhold support in the legislators' subsequent efforts to retain or 
advance in public office.162 Legislation procured in this manner, of 
course, need not coincide with public interest, but only with the inter-
est of the particular group involved in lobbying. Nevertheless, a legis-
lator who votes based on the entreaties of lobbies will not necessarily 
adversely affect his or her prospects of reelection. If the adverse public 
effects of the legislation are diffuse, contesting the legislation will not 
be worthwhile to any adversely affected individual, even if aggregate 
costs outweigh aggregate benefits. 163 Nor will support of a particular 
piece of special interest legislation necessarily cost the legislator much 
support in the voting booth, even among those who identify the con-
duct as a defalcation. Representatives must be voted for on the basis 
of the package of programs they support; voters cannot pick and 
choose among the various issues for which a legislator stands. Thus, a 
vote on any particular piece of special interest legislation is unlikely to 
offend sufficient numbers of voters to affect chances at reelection. 164 
Secondly, some legislators are beyond simple electoral control. 
Most obviously, this phenomenon occurs when a politician is serving 
what is anticipated to be his or her "last" term and thus need not 
account to the electorate for actions taken during the period. This is 
not to say that even self-interested legislators will consistently ignore 
the public interest. Exogenous constraints may prevent wholly self-
interested conduct by the representative even during an ultimate term: 
162. Krier & Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 405, 
423-24 (1985); D. PARFIT, supra note 70, at 64. 
163. In an extreme example of this phenomenon, H. Ross Perot, a wealthy businessman, 
contributed $27,000 to legislators who were influential in adding to a tax bill a provision that 
would have provided him, and very few, if any, other individuals substantial tax benefits - $15 
million in Perot's case. See R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 78. 
164. Incumbents appeal to voters for reasons having little or nothing to do with the positions 
taken by the incumbents on the issues of the day. See, e.g., Samuelson, A Test of the Revealed-
Preference Phenomenon in Congressional Elections, 54 PUB. CHOICE 141 (1987). For a recent 
description of incumbents' capacity to achieve reelection notwithstanding deviations from the 
interests of constituents, see Incumbent Lawmakers Use the Perks of Office to Clobber Opponents, 
Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (recent reelection rate of 98% in the House of 
Representatives). 
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fear of conviction may dissuade bribery or blatant conflicts of interest; 
concern for reputation or (more likely at the national level) a "place in 
history," or expectation of nonelectoral rewards such as appointive of-
fice for good last-term performance, may encourage attention to public 
concerns. 165 The problem of nonaccountability, however, does indi-
cate that plebiscites are not unique in their vulnerability to special 
interests. 
Finally, incumbents may have opportunities to manipulate voter 
preferences in order to avoid penalties for self-interested behavior. In 
a jurisdiction with voters who have heterogeneous preferences, Fer-
ejohn suggests, the incumbent may play off voters against each other, 
so that a majority will not form to remove the representative from 
offi.ce.166 Alternatively, representatives may act in a more publicly in-
terested manner as elections approach and avoid the invective of a my-
opic electorate for earlier defalcations.161 
Both representatives and the electorate, then, are vulnerable to spe-
cial interests, to the concept of "capture" that has been used to explain 
administrative behavior inconsistent with public interest. 168 If capture 
is possible at the legislative as well as the plebiscitary level, however, 
one might sensibly ask, in which forum is it more likely to occur? The 
focus of some commentators on campaign finance implies that the 
electorate is disproportionately susceptible to unreasoned media cam-
paigns, so that well-financed interest groups have less difficulty per-
suading voters to share their position than do poorly financed grass-
roots organizations.169 Nevertheless, even the evidence mustered in 
support of campaign finance reform is, at best, ambiguous on the issue 
of electoral susceptibility to confusion and dishonesty. 170 
Much of our understanding of collective action suggests a contrary 
conclusion - that capture would be facilitated by creation of a deci-
165. Barro suggests the use of appointive offices as rewards in order to control politicians in 
their ultimate term. Barro, supra note 161, at 28. 
If politicians announced that their next term would be their last (or if they face a statutory 
limit on the number of terms they can serve), an electorate concerned about unaccountability 
would not return those politicians to office. Of course, this leads to a lovely Zeno's paradox. 
Politicians, knowing they will not be returned to office for the "last term" will misbehave, unac· 
countably, in their penultimate term (actually their last term); voters, sensing this, will not return 
these politicians to office for their penultimate terms; politicians respond by acting selfishly dur· 
ing the previous term, and so on down the line until no one can be elected to anything. See 
Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 Pua. CHOICE 5, 10 (1986). 
166. Ferejohn, supra note 165, at 21. 
167. See Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169 (1975). 
168. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971); Peltzmnn, 
supra note 161. 
169. See sources cited in note 150 supra. 
170. See Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 551-54. 
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sionmaking body like a legislature. Collective action theory suggests 
that groups are more likely to coalesce in ways that solve problems of 
free riding where they are small and insular, thereby facilitating efforts 
to monitor members' activities and to appeal to unified interest. 171 
These same features, however, should tend to make small, discrete 
groups whose members share a common objective (e.g., reelection) 
more susceptible to the influence of interest groups than atomized in-
dividuals. Unlike the electorate (diffuse and relatively disinterested in 
the benefits that an interest group has to offer), the legislature consti-
tutes a body small in number, easily reachable, and (according to cap-
ture theory) seriously interested in the (electoral) benefits that an 
interest group can offer. Lobbyists are likely to have repeated contacts 
with legislators, to know their views on a variety of subjects, and to 
have access that cannot be replicated in the case of individual voters. 
While few within the population may vote, lobbyists cannot, ex ante, 
distinguish voters from nonvoters and must direct their appeals to all. 
Thus, to the extent that interest groups engage in lobbying as a means 
of influencing legislation, they appear to have greater opportunities for 
success if they need only lobby a discrete and relatively fixed segment 
of the population - representatives - as opposed to the voting popu-
lation at large. Representatives may also be more susceptible to en-
treaties from lobbyists, as interest groups are able to affect 
opportunities for reelection and advancement. Lobbyists have no 
comparable threat against the electorate. Therefore, decisions made 
by legislators may be far more susceptible to interest group pressure 
than plebiscitary ones.172 Indeed, the survival in state courts of doc-
trines long abandoned by federal courts, e.g., substantive conceptions 
of "public purposes" for which governmental expenditures may be 
made173 and the nondelegation doctrine,174 reveals a relatively low ju-
171. See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 53-65 (1965); Ackerman, 
supra note 33, at 724-26. This is not to suggest that large or latent groups are incapable of 
collective action, only that there are tendencies that favor such action among smaller, insular 
groups. See R. HARDIN, supra note 20, at 38-49. 
172. See, e.g., Gude v. City of Lakewood, 636 P.2d 691, 694 (Colo. 1981) (local creation of 
building authority to finance development project for which general obligation bonds had been 
defeated at bond election by margin of 81% to 19%). 
173. Compare Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451(Fla.1985); State ex rel. 
McLeod v. Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 1981); Brown v. Longiotti, 420 So. 2d 71 (Ala. 1982), with 
Hawaii Haus. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). For an express statement of concern about 
local legislatures catering to special interests, see Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 507 
(Utah 1975) (dissenting opinion). More charitable views of the local process can be found in 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981); City 
of Charlottesville v. DeHaan, 323 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1984). 
174. See Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1962); Miller v. Covington 
Dev. Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1976). 
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dicial opinion of the capacity of legislatures to ignore the entreaties of 
special interests. 
C. External Checks on Interest Groups 
If this view is correct, it is fair to ask why interest groups ever 
attempt to enact legislation through plebiscites. One would imagine 
that they would be better served by appeals to the legislature. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the answer to this apparent anomaly may 
be that special interest groups initiate plebiscites only after failure to 
convince the legislature to enact similar provisions. The benefits of 
particular legislation may be so significant to a particular group that it 
is worth their efforts to pursue electoral override of prior legislative 
rejection. 175 
Even if that is the case, however, the plebiscite would still warrant 
substantial criticism for susceptibility to abuse by interest groups, even 
though legislatures are susceptible to greater abuses. That criticism 
would be tempered, however, if external constraints limited the ad-
verse effects of interest groups on plebiscites. Here, the constraints 
may emerge from either of two sources. The first may simply be a 
competing interest group. Where interest groups exist on both sides of 
an issue, each group may modify its position to make it more palatable 
to a range of voters (reducing transportation costs again). 176 And, the 
advantages enjoyed by a single interest group now dissipate as compet-
ing influences from the opposing group are brought to bear on deci-
sionmakers. For example, attempts to confuse or dissemble may prove 
more difficult as proponents on one side of an issue point out obfusca-
tions on the other side. 
Alternatively, courts may provide an additional filter, allowing 
popular voting only when an issue displays the salient features of visi-
bility and reputation-enhancing that I have argued render a plebiscite 
particularly likely to reflect public interest. Thus, courts could ex-
clude ballot propositions likely to evoke response only from a group 
with particularly intense sentiments on one side of the issue or that 
had no visible results, and thus did not implicate the voters' reputa-
175. See, e.g., D. MAGELBY, supra note 28, at 60. Lowenstein implies that plebiscitary pro-
posals have, as a matter of course, been previously rejected by the legislature. He suggests, how-
ever, that legislative rejection may actually have been inconsistent with the public interest and 
that plebiscites may thereby better approximate public interest. This result can be presumed 
where one-sided interest group lobbying disfavors the plebiscite. See Lowenstein, supra note 30, 
at 567-68. Briffault suggests that California initiatives on tax reform, campaign finance, and 
reapportionment followed years of legislative failure to address these issues. See Briffault, supra 
note 49, at 1371. 
176. See notes 137-38 supra and accompanying text (Hirschman on transportation costs); 
Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 152, at 331. 
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tions. The doctrinal basis for such judicial intervention lies in the am-
biguous standards that currently serve as gatekeepers to the 
plebiscitary process. Few jurisdictions permit use of the plebiscite on 
any conceivable issue. State constitutions and judicially developed 
doctrine have limited use of initiative and referendum power to pro-
positions that are "legislative" rather than "administrative" or "execu-
tive" in character.177 Additionally, most jurisdictions require a 
referendum before a state or municipality can incur "debt" in excess of 
a specified amount.118 
The content of these constitutional and judicial limits remains in-
herently nebulous. Courts have articulated distinctions between legis-
lative and administrative decisions that seem capable of justifying any 
result they wish to reach on alternative grounds. 179 Treatise state-
ments of the rules contain little to dissipate the fog; instead they cast 
the rules in ambiguous terms such as "[a]n ordinance is administrative 
if it is designed merely to enforce or carry into effect a basic policy that 
has been already established."180 Obligations that fall within the defi-
nition of "debt" obligations are increasingly difficult to characterize in 
a period of complex financing arrangements.181 
Interpretation of these doctrinal requirements is essential if they 
are to attain any concrete meaning. Presumably, any such interpreta-
tion could be predicated on some reasoned analysis of the function of 
plebiscitary measures. Once the need for a principled interpretation is 
understood, however, courts could intervene to minimize the risk of 
one-sided plebiscites by approving only those propositions that shared 
the salient features (concern for a large proportion of the relevant elec-
torate, implication of residents' reputations, and exhibition of visible 
177. See, e.g., Reagan v. City of Sausalito, 210 Cal. App. 2d 419, 26 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1962); 
Moore v. School Comm., 375 Mass. 443, 378 N.E.2d 347 (1978); OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(f); 
Merrynne v. Acker, 189 Cal. App. 2d 558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1961). 
178. See Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA L. REV. 863, 863-67 
(1967). 
179. See, e.g., Lince v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wash. App. 309, 607 P.2d 329, 330 (1980) 
(initiative dealt with legislative issue because it effected "permanent and general change" in city 
zoning law rather than merely applying current law); City of North Little Rock v. Gorman, 264 
Ark. 150, 568 S.W.2d 481 (1978) (utility rate schedule deemed "legislative," and hence subject to 
plebiscite because it prescribes new policy or plan rather than simply pursues a plan already in 
existence); In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions, 534 P.2d 3, 7 (Okla. 1975) 
(utility rate schedule deemed "administrative" and hence not subject to plebiscite because rate 
setting constitutes only a "necessary and incidental adjunct to the power constitutionally granted 
municipalities to operate a public utility"). 
180. 0. REYNOLDS, LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 727-28 (1982). 
181. Compare Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983), cert. denied sub 
nom. Chemical Bank v. Asson, 469 U.S. 870 (1984), with DeFazio v. Washington Pub. Power 
Supply Sys., 296 Or. 550, 679 P.2d 1316 (1984). See Gillette, Risk of Project Failure and the 
Definition of ''Debt," 6 MUN. FIN. J. 311 (1985). 
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results) conducive to public interest voting. I am not suggesting that 
courts have systematically used the legislative/administrative dichot-
omy to permit plebiscites only on issues likely to generate wide-rang-
ing interest and debate. 182 I am willing to assert a weak positive claim 
that courts have intuitively reached conclusions in which issues of 
broad interest are more likely to be denominated legislative, while 
those with limited appeal are more readily classified as administrative. 
One would expect, for example, that proposed zoning changes affect-
ing an entire community would be subject to a plebiscite, while zoning 
proposals affecting a small section of the community would not. In 
the cases that I have randomly reviewed, the courts have tended to 
reach results that can be reconciled with this standard. 183 The pres-
ence of numerous cases contrary to the standard, however, suggests 
that the positive claim cannot be very strong. 184 Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that courts, informed with a theory of referendum and initiative, 
could use the doctrinal distinction between legislative and administra-
tive issues to permit plebiscites consonant with that theory and ex-
clude only those that were not. This capacity suggests that courts 
could provide the same sort of checking device on private interest in 
plebiscitary situations as they do in the legislative arena. 185 Simultane-
ously, this capacity suggests that fear of minority capture of the plebi-
scite may be no more justified than similar concerns about legislative 
behavior. 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE PLEBISCITE 
None of my arguments suggests that referendum and initiative are 
appropriate for addressing al/ local issues. Instead, my arguments, if 
accepted, indicate that popular votes on issues that share certain sali-
ent characteristics can be constrained in ways that minimize devia-
182. This is not to say that courts do not occasionally refer to such a standard. See, e.g., In 
re Protest of the Referendum Petition Filed with the City Clerk, 610 P.2d 243, 246 (Okin. 1980) 
(determining referendum proposal for de-annexation to be legislative because "the addition or 
deletion of land from the corporate boundaries of a municipality has an impact on the entire 
community, as opposed to only the individuals directly involved"). 
183. See, e.i,, Leonard v. City ofBothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976); Forman v. 
Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973); Elliott v. City of Clawson, 
21 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821 (1970); Wheelright v. County of Marin, 2 Cal. 3d 448, 458, 
85 Cal. Rptr. 809, 467 P.2d 537 (1970) (ordinance concerning access road to planned community 
deemed subject to referendum because "[r]oadways are of sufficient public interest and concern 
to weight the scales in favor of construing this ordinance as being legislative"). 
184. See, e.g., Moore v. School Comm., 375 Mass. 443, 378 N.E.2d 47 (1978) (decision to 
close one school in city deemed legislative, although residents in that school district might haven 
particularly intense interest in keeping school open). My inability to demonstrate that courts 
have systematically intuited to this position is also demonstrated by conflicts in judicial decisions 
that alternatively classify the same issue as legislative and administrative. See note 179 supra. 
185. See Macey, supra note 10. 
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tions from public interest. Those characteristics include group size 
small enough to permit repeated interactions among identifiable mem-
bers of the community, consequences that are visible and attributable 
to particular voting groups, and issues that generate sufficient interest 
to induce participation by affected parties on all sides. 
The negative implication of this analysis is that there are discrete 
situations in which plebiscites are inappropriate. Let us, for instance, 
relax the assumption, implicit in the examples up to this point, that 
local action produces only minimal external effects. If residents of a 
locality are asked to vote on an issue that would return primarily bene-
fits to nonresidents and would impose primarily costs on existing resi-
dents, it is unlikely that they would approve the measure. The 
opportunities for future interaction with, and hence reciprocity by the 
excluded group are minimal, so that extralegal incentives to take the 
concerns of the external group into account would be lacking.186 
Thus, referenda and initiatives that concern exclusionary zoning and 
that are fraught with racial implications have been the basis on which 
many commentators have attacked plebiscites generally. 187 Failure to 
achieve optimal results from the perspective of the broader society, 
however, does not necessarily represent a failure of the plebiscite. 
Rather, it may represent the failure of local decisionmaking generally 
to consider the welfare of nonresidents. It is by no means certain that 
local legislatures would be more likely to take into account the exter-
nal effects of proposed ordinances. Indeed, the limitation of most 
home rule provisions to "municipal affairs," generally defined in a 
manner that excludes ordinances with substantial extrajurisdictional 
effects, suggests that even states subscribing to a broad view of munici-
pal autonomy wish to check the exercise of municipal conduct when it 
adversely impacts nonresidents. It is at this point that some decision-
making body representing both the municipality and the affected non-
residents - whether a court or the state legislature ~ is required to 
determine the desirability of proposed legislation. 188 Thus, there is 
substantial reason to question decisionmaking at the local level when-
ever it addresses issues that generate substantial spillovers.189 But 
contrary to what various commentators have suggested, there is less 
186. See R. AXELROD, supra note 110, at 124-32. 
187. See Bell, supra note 28, at 6-9; Sager, supra note 28, at 1376-418; Seeley, supra note 29, 
at 884-91. 
188. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 
48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964). 
189. See Gillette, supra note 141, at 1055-66. 
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reason to single out the plebiscite as a decisionmaking process particu-
larly inimical to the interests of nonresidents. 
Externalities may similarly render plebiscites inappropriate where 
local action is not informed by prejudice but would frustrate autono-
mous action by another municipality. Assume, for instance, that we 
permitted local electorates in an area circumscribing a nuclear power 
plant to determine a proper plan of evacuation in the event of a nu-
clear accident. If a northern community decides to evacuate to the 
south by turning major roads into one-way streets in that direction, 
while a southern community decides to evacuate to the north, one can 
expect autonomous action to generate collective impasse. Here again, 
however, the problem lies not in the plebiscitary basis of the local deci-
sion, but in leaving the decision in local hands at all. 
It is not only where externalities are significant that plebiscites may 
be inappropriate. Certain purely internal decisions may be poorly 
handled by the binary decision process that plebiscitary voting entails. 
Where numerous issues are integrally related, a decision procedure 
that considers all the affected issues simultaneously will be superior to 
one that considers them in isolation. Thus, numerous courts have sin-
gled out budget or appropriations decisions as those to which grants of 
plebiscitary power do not apply. 190 Assuming a fixed budget, a deci-
sion on any one expenditure necessarily affects the capacity of the city 
to consider other expenditures; plebiscites expanding school budgets 
will necessarily restrict spending on police or fire protection or other 
services. In such polycentric situations, the legislative forum has the 
distinct advantage of permitting simultaneous consideration of multi-
ple interests, a role that is less available with decisions of a zero-sum, 
yes-no variety. 191 
Where municipal residents propose to express themselves on mat-
ters of wide-ranging concern that generate neither substantial adverse 
spillovers nor potential havoc with budgetary or other polycentric is-
sues, however, there seems little merit to the claim that plebiscites are 
inappropriate. To the contrary, they may not only provide expressions 
of public interest as or more powerful than what emerges from repre-
sentative processes, they may also stimulate the conversation and con-
duct that underlie arguments for more active forms of participation. 
While my inquiry has assumed a self interested electorate, relaxation 
190. See, e.g., State ex rel. Card v. Kaufman, 517 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1974); Annotation, Coll· 
struction and Application of Constitutional or Statutory Provisions Expressly Excepting Certai11 
Laws from Referendum, 100 A.L.R.2d 314 (I965). 
191. See Gillette, supra note 59, at 965-66. See also Atlantic City Hous. Act. Coalition v. 
Deane, 181 N.J. Super. 412, 437 A.2d 918 (1981) (redevelopment process not susceptible to 
plebiscitary solution). 
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of that assumption would strengthen the argument. The more we be-
lieve that citizens are motivated by disinterested public spirit, the more 
we might be willing to delegate decisionmaking to them. The more we 
believe that such public spiritedness would be fostered by systemati-
cally conferring on citizens the responsibility for collective concerns, 
the more local plebiscites appear to be appropriate mechanisms for 
encouraging deliberation and overcoming tendencies towards expro-
priation and obstacles to cooperation.192 
This potential becomes more concrete by examining missed oppor-
tunities. During the buildup of American participation in the Vietnam 
war, residents of Willoughby Hills, Ohio proposed an initiative 
resolution: 
The President of the United States should bring all American troops 
home from Vietnam now so that the Vietnamese people can settle their 
own affairs. 
After quoting the Ohio Constitution, which provides for local initia-
tive "on all questions which such municipalities may ... be authorized 
by law to control by legislative action," the Ohio Supreme Court de-
nied a writ of mandamus to place the issue on the ballot. The court's 
one-sentence opinion concluded that the petition did not contain any 
question which a municipality is authorized by law to decide. 193 Cer-
tainly, it is true that neither the legislature nor the people of Wil-
loughby Hills had the authority to withdraw troops from Vietnam. It 
is less clear that the legislative body would have been unauthorized to 
pass a resolution on the issue, and that, therefore, the initiative power 
was unavailable to this end; the constitutional provision can be read to 
permit a plebiscite on any issue a local legislature may address. But 
even if the issue is ambiguous, it makes little sense to resolve that am-
biguity without examining whether the functions of plebiscitary de-
mocracy will be advanced or retarded by the particular proposition. It 
is difficult to imagine that either side of the troop withdrawal issue 
would have had a disproportionate interest in expressing its prefer-
ence. Given the admitted incompetence of the locality to effect with-
drawal, it is similarly difficult to comprehend adverse external effects 
from the vote (national defense being the quintessential public good). 
What may have occurred was substantial discussion within the locality 
of an issue of some moment, the very type of deliberation within the 
192. For a discussion of how placing responsibility for resolving conflict directly on those 
involved, rather than on an intermediary such as the state, may beget more altruistic solutions, 
see M. TAYLOR, supra note 67, at 168-75. 
193. State ex rel. Rhodes v. Board of Elections, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 4, 230 N.E.2d 347, 348 
(1967) (emphasis omitted). 
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electorate that proponents of representative democracy consider the 
hallmark of legislatures. 
Would deliberative discussion have ensued? Certainly some be-
lieve that discussion of such issues is too driven by passion to be 
trusted to the electorate. A similar petition to place on the ballot in 
New York City a plebiscitary proposal to create a municipal office of 
the Anti-Vietnam War Coordinator was also denied as outside the 
traditional functions of local govemment. 194 Here, again, the issue of 
the scope of municipal affairs is subject to some debate; the proposed 
officer would have had no duties other than to express the will of resi-
dents of New York City. More fundamental concerns appeared to be 
at stake: "The painful emotions of war," the judge concluded, "in-
crease the need for perspective and for calm, reasoned thought." 195 
Representatives, but not the people at large, were capable of such 
equanimity. Thus, this position suggests, even if we provide avenues 
for electoral deliberation, voters would fail to seize the opportunity. 
Ultimately, our perception of the plebiscite must be guided by our ap-
proval or disapproval of this attitude. My sense, expressed in these 
pages, is that - even viewed through the lens of public choice and 
self-interest - it is seriously misguided. 
194. Silberman v. Katz, 54 Misc. 2d 956, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895, ajfd., 28 A.D. 992, 284 
N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967). 
195. 54 Misc. 2d at 962, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 901. 
